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PREFACE: A NOTE OF EXPLANATION
Soia Mentschikoff delivered the Robert S. Marx Lectures at the University
of Cincinnati College of Law on April 13 and 14, 1981. Due to a very
• Copyright 1985 by Soia Mentschikoff and Irwin P. Stotzky
•* Former Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Miami.
Soia Mentschikoff lived a remarkable life. By any standard, her life in the law set
the guidelines for excellence in the legal profession. She was universally regarded by
those in the legal profession as an innovator, an individual who set exceptionally high
standards for legal scholars, practicing lawyers, and students.
Her record is the stuff of which legends are made. In the thirties, she became one
of the very few women to join a Wall Street law firm and be made a partner. She
later became the first woman to teach at the Harvard Law School-at the school's
invitation and at a time when no women students were admitted. She went on to help
Karl Llewellyn draft and push through the legislatures in almost every state in the
country the most significant statutory enactment in the history of American law-the
Uniform Commercial Code. During this period, Soia Mentschikoff and Karl Llewellyn
married and moved to Chicago, where she became the first woman to teach at the
University of Chicago Law School. There, they created what can only be called an
intellectual enclave within a larger institutional structure. Later, Ms. Mentschikoff
reinvigorated the University of Miami Law School, turning it into a respected and
important center for law training and intellectual ferment. At approximately the same
time that she became Dean at Miami, Ms. Mentschikoff became the first woman to
be elected president of the Association of American Law Schools. She was also the first
woman mentioned as a possible nominee for the Supreme Court of the United States.
For further discussion about Ms. Mentschikoff, see Stotzky, Soia's Way: Toiling in the
Common Law Tradition, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 373 (1984); Stotzky, Soia Mentschikoff: A
Tribute for the Association of American Law Schools (forthcoming).
*** Professor of Law, University of Miami. My work on this essay was supported
by a research grant from the University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to
Amy Ronner, Diane Seaberg, and Susan Tarbe for comments they made on earlier
drafts. I am particularly grateful to my research assistant, Anne Hayes, for the benefit
of her criticism and counsel during the completion of this essay. Errors are mine.
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heavy work schedule and her untimely illness and subsequent death, however,
she never had a chance to work her preliminary thoughts, as expressed in
her lectures, into an article. In September, 1984, Gordon Christenson,
former Dean of the University of Cincinnati College of Law, contacted me
and asked me if I would attempt to recreate Soia's views, fill in the
interstices of her lectures, and put them into article form.' I assume he
asked me to do this because of my relationship with Soia. I had worked
with Soia Mentschikofffor ten years (from 1974-1984) and had co-authored
a casebook and teachers' manual with her. I had also spent a considerable
amount of time talking with her about the nature of law and related issues.
I am, therefore, somewhat familiar with her thoughts and work.
In this article I have attempted to incorporate into a coherent theme what
I understand to be Soia's thoughts about the issues she discussed in the
lectures. I used the transcript of Soia's lectures as an outline for the article.
Wherever possible, I used her language, examples, and ideas from the
lectures to write the article. I also confined the discussion in the article to
the themes she presented in her lectures. Much of the detail of the paper is
based on conversations I had with Soia over the years, much of it follows
her written works and spoken words. Some of it is mere speculation on my
part. Although I agree with many of the themes raised in the article, I also
disagree with some parts of it. At certain points in the article, therefore, I
note my disagreement in footnotes.
One last caveat needs to be made. I have tried to be true to Soia's beliefs
as expressed in her lectures and writings throughout the piece. 2 But one can
1. Soia Mentschikoff had great vision and knew instinctively what it took to be a
great lawyer and educator. In the field of legal education, she believed especially in
the importance of skills competence, diversity in faculty, and links to other disciplines
of knowledge. Dean Christenson wished to have a wider audience share in Soia's views
on law, and asked me to work on this article for that very reason.
2. For those interested in the scholarship of Soia Mentschikoff which is relevant
to the ideas expressed in this article, one should consult the following articles: Haggard
and Mentschikoff, Responsible Decision Making in Dispute Settlement and Decision Making
and Decision Consensus in Commercial Arbitration, in LAW, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN
SOCIETY 277, 295 (1977); Mentschikoff, Codification, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD
CENTURY 195 (1976); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846
(1961), reprinted in M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1968); Mentschikoff,
The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698
(1952).
Other writings of Soia Mentschikoff which should be consulted but which are not
as directly relevant to this article include: Mentschikoff, Disagreement on Substantive
Standards and What to Do About It, 58 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Proceedings 129 (1964); Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MoD.
167 (1964); Mentschikoff, How to Handle Letters of Credit, 19 Bus. LAW 107 (1963);
Mentschikoff, Letters of Credit: The Need For Uniform Legislation, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 571
(1956); Mentshikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under The Uniform Commercial Code: A Consti-
tutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767 (1973); Mentschikoff,
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never be sure exactly what Soia meant, because her lectures were merely an
initial attempt to put together her years of thought about and experiences
with law. Further, the themes she explored in her lectures are incredibly
diverse and cover vast amounts of territory, some of which appears
unconnected. Indeed, her lectures read like a partially completed mosaic. My
task was to piece together the missing tiles in the mosaic. The article,
therefore, is only a preliminary exposition of some of her views. It does not
purport to be a fully developed theory of law. Moreover, Soia was a very
complex human being and I can only hope to have accurately sketched some
of her thoughts. 3 I might add that the task was very difficult.
I. MYOPIC VISION
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student
of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive
time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the
custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The
reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious
minds set themselves to inquire how it may be accounted for.
Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it
and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the
rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it,
and enters on a new career.
0. Holmes, The Common Law 5 (1881).
Oliver Wendell Holmes had a point. But his point is not limited
to rules of law. It extends also to the practice of law and the
training of lawyers. Furthermore, Holmes' point as applied to the
Reflections of a Drafter: Soia Mentschikoff, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 537 (1982); Mentschikoff, The
Uniform Commercial Code, An Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A. J. 419 (1950);
Morse, Mentschikoff, Dillon, Julin & Hyde, The Demand For Legal Education-Five Views,
50 FLA. B.J. 70 (1976).
Finally, there are many unpublished notes, rough drafts, letters, and studies by
Soia Mentschikoff and various collaborators which cover a wide variety of topics and
are being organized and classified at the University of Miami School of Law. Professor
William Twining of University College, London, and I have recently looked through
these papers. They will be catalogued at a later date by an archivist and made into a
permanent Soia Mentschikoff collection.
3. Soia's complexity and humanity is perhaps best expressed by the relationships
she developed with the people she met in the many years she toiled in the law. Anyone
who ever met her has a "Soia story," and this is the stuff from which legends grow.
See Stotzky, Soia's Way: Toiling in the Common Law Tradition, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 373
(1984); Stotzky, Soia Mentschikoff" A Tribute for the Association of American Law Schools,
(forthcoming)( 1985).
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legal profession is both partially right and partially wrong. Law
practice and legal education simultaneously thrive and suffer
through the uses of tradition.
In a twist on Holmes' theme, images of the past are being used
by many legal actors to justify a myopic vision of the legal world.
There is a contemporary movement in our legal culture to use
"tradition" as the scapegoat for a rather narrow view of what
law is about and how one should be trained and should perform
within that culture. The push for "specialization" at the Bar,4
the drive toward teaching students as many rules of law as three
years of legal education permit, 5 or merely teaching students
clinical, "practical" skills with very little, if any, emphasis on
substantive knowledge about the processes of the law ,6 are all
4. For many years, the legal profession has debated the merits of recognizing legal
specialization. Indeed, the controversy has generated a great deal of commentary. A
bibliography of such materials through 1979 appears at 34 THE RECORD 441 (1979).
By 1980, in a majority of the states, the Bar had either implemented a specialization
plan or had considered seriously adopting such a plan. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON
SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 7, 36-42 (1980). Moreover, despite the
intensity of the controversy over these plans, de facto recognition of specialization has
certainly been accepted by the Bar. The debate over whether to approve specialization
plans has rarely, if ever, focused upon the effect of such plans on society as a whole.
Further, the adoption of specialization programs has been largely but incorrectly viewed
as enhancing, rather than diminishing, lawyer competence.
5. In almost every law school in the nation, more professors than we like to admit
continue to require students to learn only rules of law. In some sense, the "curse of
Langdell" has never been laid to rest. It has periodically resurfaced with a vengeance
in legal education in the twentieth century. Indeed, it is arguable that, in the more
than approximately one hundred and fifteen years since Langdell was appointed Dean
of the Harvard Law School, there have been few, if any, radical changes in American
legal education.
Christopher C. Langdell believed that the purpose and method of legal education
was to teach students to uncover the principles of law by analyzing their source, the
cases. He placed great emphasis on law as a science, analogous to the physical sciences.
As a science, law involved the search for general, consistent principles, to be discovered
by the study of particular instances. Further, reported cases were the source of the
study. Because Langdell believed that in a law school students should study only the
law, every source material except for cases lay outside the boundaries of a law school
education. A broad liberal arts education, therefore, was not the function of a law
school. For a discussion of Langdell's views, see, e.g., W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 10-12 (1973); THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL (1918); A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD (1917); K. LLEWELLYN,
JURISPRUDENCE 376-79 (1962); Fessenden, The Rebirth of the Harvard Law School, 33
HARV. L. REV. 493 (1920). On some level, realism as a movement was a reaction to
"formalism," and Langdell was seen as the leading representative of that approach.
6. Clinical exercises are often performed by students who do not possess the
necessary substantive knowledge about the area in which the problem arises. For
example, certain trial skills, such as cross-examination, are often taught in the context
of a problem with which a student is entirely unfamiliar. This leads to a false assumption
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manifestations of the argument that lawyers traditionally need to
know only information per se. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to
say that the legal world increasingly is becoming a one-dimensional
world, a world where people are judged as though they were one-
dimensional characters, "paper people under cardboard stars,"
to paraphrase an old song.7 Not only people, but also legal
institutions are viewed in exceptionally narrow and one-dimen-
sional ways. Contrary to this view, the law does not consist only
of adjudication and formal legal structures. It consists also of non-
binding, informal customs between individuals and groups.
The drive toward this limited view of the world permeates the
practice of law. It is fashionable to tell people that they do not
know anything unless they have a great deal of knowledge about
a very tiny aspect of a particular field of law. Hence, it is argued
that a solid legal education, as well as competent law practice,
should consist of the teaching and practice of infinitesimal detail
that may or may not make a difference in the overall theory and
practice of law. This emphasis on detail, on seeing more of the
little and less of the whole, turns out lawyers who lack an overall
understanding of the system as a whole. This misdirected edu-
cational and practice emphasis thus turns out lawyers who see
less and less of what the world is really like. To put it another
way, their legal lenses have severe blinders on them. This, in
by students that knowledge of "how to do it"-how to perform a cross-examination
of a witness, for example,-is sufficient without knowledge of the field of law at issue.
In out-house clinical programs, where students are placed in public agencies such as a
State Attorney's office or a Public Defender's office, the problem of lack of knowledge
is compounded. Often, supervision of the student is non-existent. Students are thrown
into a process where representation of clients is left awlnost totally to them. At other
times, the supervising attorney is himself minimally competent or worse, and therefore
fosters the false view that lack of substantive knowledge is acceptable. Students have a
role model that supports their false image of reality. If a lawyer does not know the law
in detail, students perceive that such knowledge is an unnecessary ingredient of a
successful lawyer. In-house clinical programs are more likely to teach the significance
of knowledge. But even these programs often lack proper supervision and often fail to
teach students the importance of knowledge. There are, of course, a number of law
schools that do a very good job of pushing knowledge as a key aspect of trial advocacy.
We note, for example, the Clinical and Trial Advocacy Programs at the University of
Miami School of Law, and the in-house clinic at the University of Chicago Law School.
None of this is to say that clinical education cannot make or has not made a
significant contribution to legal education. The debate over the methods and significance
of clinical education continues unabated. For a discussion of this debate and a general
bibliography of the literature in this area, see Anderson & Catz, Towards a Comprehensive
Approach to Clinical Education. A Response to the New Reality, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 727 (1981).
7. It's Only A Paper Moon, music by H. Arlen, lyrics by B. Rose & E. Harburg
(1933).
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turn, limits their perceptions of the social world. We intend, like
the little boy and the emperor,8 to expose the fact that this view
of law has no clothes on; it is intellectually barren. It is also a
disaster to our legal culture and to the larger civilization in which
our law thrives. Such a narrow view fails totally to deal with a
very complex world.
All of what we have said does not mean or even suggest that
knowledge is unimportant . On the contrary, the acquisition and
use of knowledge is the single most significant factor in the
teaching and practice of law. But it is not knowledge of infinites-
imal detail that is needed. Rather, one needs to acquire knowledge
not only of rules of law, but also of the processes of the formal
and informal legal system, and of how things interact within those
processes. Moreover, that knowledge must constantly be subjected
to analysis and criticism.
A holistic approach to analyzing problems as they arise in the
world is a prerequisite to the training of an artist in the law.
Lawyers must acquire knowledge of how people interact, think,
and operate. But this is not all. Lawyers must understand how
institutions, forces, desires, and dreams interact in any legal and
social context. This is so precisely because law deals with the
interactions of people and institutions in particular social settings.
There is a relation, always, between what is going on in the world
and what is happening in the statutory or case law. On the formal
legal side, this is seen in the court's approach to cases and in the
court's decisions about the issues that they perceive as arising in
the cases.
Law schools should, therefore, be in the business of training
people in the theory and craft of law. Again, on the formal legal
side, lawyers must undrstand how the courts behave, and what
the role of counsel is in the behavior of the courts. They must
also understand the impact the court's action has on counsel's
behavior, on the client's situation, and even on the life situation
itself. They must be taught to determine whether what counsel
does is good, bad, or indifferent. Further, lawyers must be trained
to learn how to judge what the effects of the court's and counsel's
actions are on the society as a whole.
All of this follows from the fact that law is an art, requiring
vision and good sense. Theory and craft are intertwined and are
essential concepts of the process of learning how to become an artist
8. H.C. ANDERSEN, The Emperor's New Clothes, in THE COMPLETE ANDERSEN (1947).
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in law. The best practical training a law school can give to any
lawyer is the study of law as a liberal art. In this vision of legal
education, there are three necessary components to a first rate
education-the technical, the intellectual, and the spiritual." With-
9. The results of a true liberal arts education, which combines the "threefold
cord" of the technical, intellectual, and spiritual aspects of law, are clearly visible in
the artist in law. The problems of how to create a liberal arts curriculum in law schools,
which provides this "cord" of knowledge and how to engage as a student in this
educational process, however, has been the subject of debate in law schools and in the
legal profession for many years. See Bunn, Cavers, Falknor, Feczer, Moreau & Llewellyn,
The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 345 (1945); Abramson, Law,
Humanities and the Hinterlands, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27 (1979); Elkins, The Paradox of a
Life in Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 129 (1979); Freedman, The Law as Educator, 70 IOWA
L. REV. 487 (1985); Freilich, The Divisional Program at Yale: An Experiment For Legal
Education in Depth, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443 (1969); Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L.
REV. 35 (1950); Cellhorn, "Humanistic Perspectives": A Critique, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 99
(1982); -Hazard, Jr., Competing Aims of Legal Education, 59 N.D.L. REV. 533 (1979);
Hall, Toward a Liberal Legal Education, 30 IOWA L. REV. 394 (1945); Kalven, Liberal
Education, The Case System, and Jurisprudence, 14 U. Cn. L. REV. 215 (1947); Kronstein,
Experience of Other Countries For Our Use in Building Legal Education After The War, 30 IOWA
L. REV. 373 (1945); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); Llewellyn, McDougal and Lasswell
Plan For Legal Education, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 476 (1943)(a critique of the plan for legal
education proposed in the Lasswell and McDougal article cited above); Murphy, The
Role of "Non-Practical" or "Cultural" Courses, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 139 (1962); Pound,
Legal Education in a Unifying World, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 5 (1952); Reich, Toward The
Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965); Rheinstein, Education For Legal
Craftsmanship, 30 IOWA L. REV. 408 (1945); Van Doren, Implications of Jurisprudence to
Law Teaching and Student Learning, 12 STETSON L. REV. 613 (1983); White, The Study of
Law as an Intellectual Activity, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1982); A Symposium in Honor of Hardy
C. Dillard: Legal Education, 54 VA. L. REV. 583 (1968); Comment, Legal Theory and
Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 1153 (1970); Report and Recommendations of The Task Force
on Lawyer Competency: The Role of The Law Schools (1979) ABA SEC. OF LEG. ED. AND
ADM. TO BAR.
Soia Mentschikoff believed so strongly in the law as a liberal art view of legal
education that when she assumed the Deanship at Miami in 1974, she constructed a
curriculum to meet the goal of training the artist in law. The linchpin of her program
was reflected in the first year curriculum. In an attempt to teach basic craft skills
combined with theory, she introduced a course called "Elements of the Law." The
implementation of the skills competency component in the first year was directly
strengthened through the creation of an ambitious research and writing program. The
course in Elements deals with the theoretical foundations of case and statutory analysis,
doctrinal synthesis, factual perceptions, and the role of law in our society. The theoretical
components are combined with a stringent tutorial course in legal research and writing,
taught by selected tutors. This course teaches basic research, the use of case, statutory,
and regulatory materials, all taught in a series of research and writing assignments,
and ends with elementary moot court. The materials in Elements were developed over
a thirty year period. Those materials were published as a casebook in 1981: S.
MENTSCHIKOFF AND I. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW-ELEMENTS
(1981). An extensive teacher's manual to this Casebook which discusses, inter alia, the
jurisprudential underpinnings of a liberal arts approach to law training, was published
in 1983. The approximately twelve years of legal research and writing assignments are
on file at the University of Miami School of Law.
1986]
CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW
out a rigorous training in effective technical proficiency, the
mechanical aspects of law, one lacks the base for theory. The
intellectual side of the art of law emanates from and is dependent
upon the level of technical proficiency enjoyed by the lawyer. Just
as in other arts, technical mastery liberates instead of binds. It
allows one to explore the means to justice or to political, social,
or commercial wisdom, or whatever other goals may be thought
desirable by the larger society. It builds on tradition, on what
came before, to allow brilliant new creations in the resolutions of
disputes or in the pursuit of justice. At the same time, the judge,
lawyer, or scholar is forced to be continually responsive to reasoned
justification within that tradition. Stated otherwise, the search for
the ideal result is limited by the means and methods one can employ
to reach that result- tradition.' 0 Yet this very limitation of means
in the art of law, as in any other art, liberates as well as binds the
artist.'' It frees up the creative energies of the artist. It also allows
10. By use of the word "tradition," in this context, we mean the ways of arguing,
writing, and thinking about legal problems that have been used by the actors in our
legal culture throughout the past centuries. We also mean to include the study and use
of the dispute resolution mechanisms employed within that culture, and the impact
those mechanisms have on the behavior of individuals, groups, and the institutions
within that larger society. Moreover, ways of thinking, writing, and arguing affect the
behavior of individuals and groups, and more generally affect society and its institutions.
These factors are therefore included within our definition of tradition.
11. The tension between ideal result and limitation of means and methods exists
in all of our arts. It is, we believe, a prerequisite for the definition of an endeavor as
an art form. It is also far more than a simple conflict between polar extremes. For
example, almost all painting that is considered by our society as having artistic value
is restricted to a single flat surface. "Three dimensional painting" does not exist. This
is, clearly, a significant constriction of reality. Further, the range of variations in such
things as color, tone, and dimension found in the *natural world are strikingly and
geometrically greater than the values of luminosity or clarity'in painting. But we believe
that these very limitations both bind and free up the art of painting. To put it another
way, it may be that painting, as we understand it, would not exist without the severe
restrictions that define its reality. Certainly, the case is the same for architecture, music,
and any other art one can imagine. Moreover, we are convinced that brilliant new
innovations in architecture, in music, in painting, as well as in law, come from building
upon the almost infinitely rich, powerful, and contrasting resources of what came
before in that art. That is, we believe that such creations, to be true creations, must
employ the experience of all the traditions suggested by the history of that particular
art in all its stages for their working materials and methods. We note as examples of
brilliant new artistic creations that built upon tradition in the arts of architecture,
music, and painting, the Frank Lloyd Wright School of Architecture, Jazz music, and
Impressionist painting. While all of these art forms were new and different, they owed
their creation to the traditions that came before and upon which all of these arts, of
necessity, built. The same, of course, can be said about brilliant new theories in the
social and physical sciences. Marx's work about man and society, and Einstein's theory
of relativity, for example, were the results of building on tradition. For a somewhat
similar view of law as an art see Christenson, In Pursuit of The Art of Law, 21 AM.
U.L. REV. 629 (1972); J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION xxiv-xxv (1973).
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the legal actor to strive for beauty or service in the art of law,
both within and without formal legal institutions. This is the
fulfillment of the spiritual aspect of the law.
Law is also an activity; it is something that people do. It is a
set of social and intellectual practices that define a culture in
which each lawyer must learn to function both as a lawyer and
as an individual human being. 2 For example, on both an ele-
mentary and sophisticated level, one object of a solid legal
education is to teach students to master the language fashioned
by courts as the means by which cases arising on particular issues
are to be addressed, and to subject that discourse to analysis and
criticism. To think in one-dimensional terms, to think that merely
learning detailed information about a very small area is the task
of the lawyer, therefore, is a very dangerous position to espouse.
It bears no relationship to reality.
But the problem runs even deeper. Law is not simply a separate
culture; it is also a part of a broader culture. As part of the
greater civilization, law bears a strong relationship to the ways
people act, the ways people are organized, and the ways people
use their intellectual and material resources. Indeed, one of the
needs of the lawyer is to understand the roles law plays in society.
In a very general sense, law provides the maintenance aspect of
order which is a precondition to any complex civilization. Law
makes order express. Furthermore, law uses tools from the rest
of the culture-language, logic, writing-to achieve that order.
It also borrows from the other disciplines to create the subject
matter of its thinking. It borrows the whole stock of standards,
ethics, and practices from the economic and social spheres of our
civilization to use as its materials for the working of its ways.
Law also adds enormously to the intellectual development of our
society. It forces people to generalize about likenesses and differ-
ences. Not least of all, law forces us to think about justice.'
12. Law demands that the individual be able to think one thing and yet, within
certain ethical and practical boundaries, say something quite different. It takes a special
kind of mind and character to handle this contradictory requirement without damage
to one's own intellectual and moral integrity, and with positive results for the general
welfare. The effort can be a significant strain on some personalities. Indeed, one of
the major tensions in the lives of first year law students comes from these strange
demands of the legal culture.
13. Soia Mentschikoff believed that Western civilization owed its conception of
justice to law. To Soia, it was questionable whether the idea and the ideal of justice
would ever have come about without the idea of law and its constraints having first
been created. I am not so sure. I believe that the matter may run the other way; that
19861
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Obviously, simply learning details and nothing else, simply seeing
the world in a one-dimensional way, makes for a limited lawyer
and poses significant problems for the operation of our social
world and our culture.
Given all of this, it is clear that the nature of the legal discipline
is such that one cannot practice any piece of law, one cannot
think about and write about or teach any piece of it, without
understanding the relationship between all of its pieces. Lawyers
must be "jacks-of-all-trades"; they must be able to deal with such
complicated ideas as competing theories of psychology, economics,
politics, sociology, and commercial wisdom. Lawyers must un-
derstand these disciplines and utilize them in the problems they
deal with in their practices. Hence our theme is that law must
be maintained as the last of the universal disciplines. The rest of
the article elaborates on this theme. It gives an overview of the
functions and processes of law and thus illustrates the necessity
for broad substantive knowledge about a variety of skills and
topics in the successful teaching, learning, and practice of law.
is, Western civilization may owe law to the concept of justice. Law as a social institution
that claims justice as its goal, however, is a unique institution. To put it another way,
it may be that the law's greatest contribution to our culture is its attempt to create the
machinery for achieving justice and to test its accomplishments. Indeed, it is at least
arguable that United States Supreme Court opinions on public issues, along with
achieving other goals, attempt to do this very thing-provide justice. For example, the
effort by the Supreme Court to transform Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), into practice was an attempt to provide justice by creating the machinery for
doing so. It required the courts to radically transform the status quo by reconstructing
social reality. The courts had to restructure the public school system and overcome a
most intense resistance by certain groups to change. Courts became the guardians and
watchdogs-the machinery-to create and monitor these changes. On the other hand,
it may be that we do not know what justice is, but can better address injustice. If so,
binding court decisions on important public issues may merely be viewed as stopping
injustices which have occurred within the context of those issues.
Another distinct possibility is that law may merely create images of justice that do
not reflect reality. This, of course, can cause great social harm. Some of the critical
legal studies movement literature argues these points. See, e.g., Boyle, The Politics of
Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985);
Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism: How the Burger Court's Political Imagery
Legitimizes the Privatization of Everyday Life, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 263 (1984); Horwitz,
Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980); Kennedy, Toward
an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in
America, 1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3 (S. Spitzer ed. 1980);
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209 (1979);
Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law in THE POLITICS OF LAW 65 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982); Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought in THE PoLITIcs OF LAW 18
(D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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II FUNCTIONS OF THE LAW
To show that the nature of the legal discipline is such that a
lawyer must have a broad understanding of the interrelationship
of law's multifaceted dimensions to work properly within the legal
culture, we begin our exploration of the topic with a preliminary
question: How can one define law?' 4 One way to approach that
question is to discuss the functions that the law serves in any
society, 5 including our own.
There are at least three major functions of law: dispute settle-
ment, channeling and rechanneling behavior, and allocating the
final say." Lawyers play integral roles in each of these functions.
14. We do not intend to explore the questions of whether law exists in our culture
or whether it serves a legitimate function. Soia Mentschikoff believed that these were
somewhat preposterous questions. To Soia, law was the matrix of all group life. Further,
because people generally followed the dictates of the law, law was legitimate. Soia was
very optimistic about law. She believed that law has an autonomous content and that
it restrains and channels the exercise of power. She also believed that the existing
collection of rules, procedures, and legal practices, though flawed at points, adds up
to a reasonably tolerable structure for social order. Hence, in Soia's view, a competent
lawyer who works within the structure will, in the long run, contribute to the overall
good of society.
I am not as optimistic as Soia was about the role of law in our society. I believe
that questions about the law's legitimacy in our civilization must be pursued vigorously.
Nor am I convinced that our social structure, as protected through our legal practices,
is just. Further, law is, in some sense, a mythical construct. It exists only because we
invent it. Inventions sometimes legitimate intolerable social practices. The institution
of slavery in the United States before the Civil War, and the institution of Apartheid
in South Africa, are but two obvious examples.
15. When we say "any society," we mean the family and other small groups as
well as the larger society. The family, which can be as small as two people, is the
smallest society we know. Further, the functions that law serves in that society are the
same as the functions that law serves in the larger society.
16. Law serves instrumental as well as intrinsic functions. The three major functions
of the law discussed in this article serve both as an instrument to an end and as an
end within our broader culture.
The ground breaking work on combining social science research and legal theory
as applied to a real society, in this case the "legal" institutions of American Indians,
was done by Karl Llewellyn in combination with E. Adamson Hoebel. See K. LLEWELLYN
& E.A. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). In their work, they discuss the functions
law plays in American Plain's Indian society, which somewhat parallel those expressed
in this essay. Professor Llewellyn thought of jurisprudence as a social science. He
viewed the law itself as a sociocultural phenomena. To Llewellyn, law in any society
was inextricably bound up with, influenced by, and influencing that society's culture.
He studied other cultures to gain insight into things legal and he used that insight to
argue for improvement in our legal culture, particularly in the adjudicatory mechanisms
employed in dispute settlement. Others have built upon his cultural studies. See, e.g.,
the essays collected in L. NADER, LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (1969), and the
bibliographies in L. FALLERS, LAW WITHOUT PRECEDENT (1969), and M. GLUCKMAN,
THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE (1965).
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Indeed, to understand the significance of lawyers and law in our
broader civilization, one must understand the varying roles lawyers
play in serving these functions.
The most basic function of law, and a fundamental aspect of
any legal system, is dispute settlement. One of the prime requisites
of a peaceful society or group is that the settlement of trouble
cases be by processes which do not splinter the group in such a
way as to destroy its groupness. In most groups, therefore, dispute
resolution machinery requires processes that are non-violent in
character. ,7
Every legal system, if it is to survive, must create machinery
for resolving disputes to a sufficient degree, with a sufficient
regularity, and with a sufficient willingness by the group to abide
by the result. Stated otherwise, the most basic function of law is
to settle disputes well enough so that the society does not disin-
tegrate, and so that the people whose law it is will follow its
commands.
The bare bones requirement of any legal system is to provide
dispute settlement machinery of some kind that will perform that
minimal function. Each individual, small group, and larger society
also has aspirations, but they come later. The dispute settlement
function, which is the bare bones function of any legal system,
becomes the law of the group. Moreover, it is the way through
which the law of the group can best be seen.'
The second basic function of law-the channeling and rechan-
neling of behavior-is concerned with what we call the aspirational
aspects of law. The aspirational aspects of law reflect the values
17. Some groups resolve disputes in a violent manner but still retain their groupness.
For example, trial by battle and trial by ordeal employed violent processes for dispute
settlement. The reason those processes worked, and the reason that people believed
that the results of the contests were legitimate, was, of course, because of the particular
society's belief in pre-ordained destiny. To put it another way, if the relevant society
believes that the winner of the battle or the survivor of the ordeal is predetermined by
an outside force, then the results of the contest can be accepted. As long as that belief
is present, this is a marvelous way of settling disputes. Justice prevails because a higher
power determines the result. Thus, an individual's belief that he was correct could be
seen as a mistake by that individual which was corrected by a higher power. If this
belief prevails in a society, even tossing a coin will be a marvelous way of resolving
disputes. It will also be a very efficient and cheap way of resolving disputes. The side
of the coin that comes up is determined by a higher force. The outcome of a coin toss,
the battle, or the ordeal, therefore, can be accepted as beyond the control of any
individual human being.
18. The dispute settlement function and the mechanisms employed to resolve disputes
reflect the values of the groups involved and the importance they place on particular
behavior. See infra text and accompanying notes 26-40.
[Vol. 54
THE LAST UNIVERSAL DISCIPLINE
we hold dear in our society, such as truth, freedom, and justice.
These values are, in some sense, culturally derived. There are
other aspirational aspects of law, however, that are biologically
derived. They are also reflected in our legal culture. For example,
almost from the time babies are born they are reaching out for
something. It may be something as simple as love. Further, when
human beings develop, they aspire for something beyond the
minimal physical needs. One need not aspire to greatness but, at
some point in life, everybody aspires to do something for oneself
and for others. At some point, individuals within a group may
have conflicting aspirations. Moreover, all of the conflicting
aspirations may be acceptable. But, in terms of claims which have
an arguable morality, an arguable need, and an arguable desir-
ability, they cannot all be satisfied. There is not enough justice,
for example, to satisfy everybody's felt need for some kind of
satisfaction. The behavior conditioning function of law deals with
attempting to work out a system that creates an image of
"fairness" and recognizes that reasonable people differ in terms
of their perceptions of the allocation. The fact that they differ is
an aspirational aspect of law. Thus, to keep disputes at a minimum,
to stop conflicting aspirations between individuals from bursting
into a conflagration, law is created to get people to behave in
certain ways. In sum, because of this aspirational quality, and
because peace between individuals and groups is necessary to a
society's own survival, one of the things law does is to channel
and rechannel behavior.
Although this function of the law sounds like a very simplistic
one, it is the most complex function that the law performs. It is
also the most difficult function that the law performs and it is the
least satisfactorily completed function that the law performs in
anything other than bare bones character.
The third function that the law has in any kind of a complex
society, and even in the small group, is to allocate the final say.
That is, law determines who has the final power of decision.
Somebody has to have that power. That somebody may be one
person or a group of persons, but some identifiable somebody
has to make the final say. The law is responsible for allocating
that say and determining who the final decision maker will be.
The process of allocating the final say varies greatly among
legal systems. In the United States, discussion of this function of
law usually centers on whether the Federal government-the
President or some administrative agency, the Congress, the Su-
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preme Court' 'i-or the State government, in all its ramifications,
shall have the final say. This focus on government results from
our concern with Constitutional commands. In areas not covered
by the structural restraints of the Constitution, however, there is
a viable alternative to government: the particular private parties
involved in the transaction.
On another level, it is important to understand that the power
to decide finally, is also the power to decide incorrectly. Hence,
to whom the legal system gives the power to decide issues both
correctly and incorrectly is an issue with which one must be
concerned. This has consequences as to, for example, whether
members of the society even follow the dictates of the law.
A. Dispute Settlement
1. The Nature of Disputes
Dispute settlement is a fundamental aspect of any legal system."'
It is a safety valve mechanism for the continuance of the group
and the society. Without some mechanisms for the settlement of
trouble cases by non-violent processes, and in a way acceptable
to the members of a group, the continued existence of a group is
in doubt. In this section, we discuss the elements and contours
of dispute settlement.
19. In the United States, the group that comes closest to determining who has the
final say is the Supreme Court of the United States. That is unique in the history of
mankind. Further, it is a very strange group to have this power when you consider
how it is selected, its size, and its multiplicity. There is something in our system,
however, that makes it work. Increasing the Supreme Court's power is the fact that,
as a cultural characteristic, the commitment by our citizens to the rule of law is almost
universal. If it is perceived by our society that the Supreme Court has the power and
authority to allocate the final say, then citizens will follow the commands of the Court.
Moreover, the authority of the law in our society, although having some boundaries,
is almost without limits. Indeed, this was recognized well over a century ago by de
Tocqueville. I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 123-32 (London 1838).
Thus, the Supreme Court enjoys a rather significant and almost unimpeachable position
in determining the final say.
20. Dispute settlement is one of' the major functions of law, but not necessarily the
major purpose of adjudication. This is particularly so in constitutional cases involving
the restructuring of federal or state bureaucracies. In these types of cases, adjudication
serves as a mechanism by which judges give meaning to our public values through the
enforcement of public norms reflected in the Constitution. See Fiss, Forward: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). Dispute resolution becomes secondary to this
function. The roots of this type of adjudication are Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny.
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When we refer to disputes, it is important to consider the
parties to a dispute, the subjects of a dispute, and the mechanisms
involved in settling them. In general, when we refer to the parties
involved in disputes, we are speaking of all types of parties. A
dispute may arise between individuals in their private lives or
between an individual and a private group. A dispute may arise
between private groups. It may arise between government in any
of its manifestations and an individual. It may arise between
government and private groups in any of their manifestations. It
may arise between government or pieces or branches of govern-
ment, whether it is local, state, or federal, and whether it is
executive branch, legislative branch, independent agency, or
judicial branch. When we speak about the nature of disputes,
therefore, we are speaking about a broad spectrum of parties.
We are also speaking in a very interesting way about all kinds
of subjects. The disputes may range from the very informal,
private, everyday problem,2 to immensely complicated and sig-
nificant public issues. For example, a "simple dispute" may arise
between a wife and husband about a dinner arrangement. The
wife has agreed to come home earlier than usual for dinner, and
the husband has spent several hours cooking a spectacular dinner.
Then comes the phone call. The wife tells her husband that she
must stay late at the office. She has to work on a complicated
securities case or on a criminal case and the pleadings are due in
court early the next morning. Her husband is offended; he wishes
her to come home at once. One can spell out that dispute as far
as one likes. Is it a legal dispute? Is it a complicated dispute?
Obviously, depending on the possible consequences of a failure
to resolve it, the simple dispute can be very complicated. The
techniques used to resolve it may sometimes be very similar to
those used in resolving great public disputes. The mechanisms
for settlement of a "simple dispute" are, however, usually, but
not always, different than those employed in a complicated
21. The simplest kind of dispute, of course, would be one between two private
persons, affecting no other member of the society and requiring no specialized knowledge
of any kind for its just resolution. Such a dispute would be exemplified by a controversy
between two automobile drivers as to who should go first at an intersection, and settled
by a traffic policeman who waved one of them on while holding up the other. Of
course, if the controversy involved a busy intersection with a consequent piling back
of traffic, the policeman, in making his decision as to who should go first, would be
calling upon his expert knowledge of which avenues of traffic would be more seriously
affected by the continued delay of several seconds.
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dispute.22 Further, the basis of making a settlement operate in
both types of disputes is legal.
On the other extreme, a dispute may deal with enormously
important issues involving the whole economy of the nation, and
it may involve multiple parties. For example, a dispute may arise
about energy conservation regarding oil reserves. Unlike the
personal dispute between spouses, which will most likely be
resolved by negotiation, this type of dispute is more likely to be
settled by legislative or administrative action.2" This public, com-
plex dispute is usually multidimensional and it is usually unre-
solvable. Stated otherwise, nobody knows how to answer the issues
raised by the dispute. Ultimate truth is not discoverable."' In the
United States, the typical response to such a complex dispute has
been to pass it off to so-called expert, administrative agencies that
are merely told to do what is in the "public good.""5
22. In the traffic example discussed in note 21, supra, few would feel that there was
any necessity for an adversary procedure. Most everyone would agree that the major
value involved lay in moving the traffic forward, regardless of where abstract justice
lay as between the two drivers. So too in the stock exchange, if there be a controversy
between two bidders as to who bid in at a certain price, the toss of a coin can settle
the dispute.
As the dispute proceeds up the chain of complexity, however, whether it be along
the continuum of who the parties are or the effect of the decision on other people or
the knowledge necessary to make a just decision, these simplified procedures become
less and less satisfactory. In the range of what we might call the middle areas of
complexity stand the courts. If, however, the parties are too important, or the effect
on the total polity is too enormous, or the degree of expert knowledge required is more
than can be reasonably expected from our method of training judges, the formal legal
system turns to other mechanisms of dispute settlement.
23. This is true for many public, complex disputes. If, for example, the dispute is
between another nation and our nation, our courts will not usually decide the dispute.
It is then left to the area of negotiation and mediation by the executive. If the dispute
is between the whole of organized labor on the one hand and employers on the other,
the matter is left to the legislature. If the matter is one requiring detailed knowledge
of the mechanics of operating railroads or public utilities or radio or television, the
matter is left to administrative agencies. As soon as we move out of the middle range
of what the courts are handling, however, into the ranges of handling by other deciders,
we are faced with the question of whether an adversary system is best suited to the
production of a just result. For a discussion of the adversary system, see infra text
accompanying notes 57-60.
24. Incomplete knowledge, scientific or social, or false data, skewed communication
of what information is available, and failure to put all the pieces of the puzzle together,
often lead to incorrect solutions. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
25. Expert training, either in a profession or in a discipline, is rarely accompanied
by training in the functions and needs of the larger civilization. This also holds true
for business training or experience. As it approaches expert status, the business training
tends to be narrowed to the needs of the particular business group at issue. Judges,
too, tend to bring with them the attitudes and values of their prior practice experience.
The redeeming factor on the appellate courts is that judges usually sit in panels of
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2. Forms of Dispute Settlement, From Least Formal to Most
Formal: How Disputes Get Resolved
Although most people simply assume that courts are the official
organs for dispute settlement in the United States, it is clear that
most trouble cases are decided by institutional arrangements other
than the formal legal process. These methods can be methods
either of compromise or of decision.2 Every lawyer is, of course,
conscious of the frequency with which negotiated settlements are
made directly through the parties to disputes. Every lawyer is
also cognizant of the great number of negotiated settlements
achieved through the intervention of an agreed or volunteer third
party, such as the machinery employed in mediation or concili-
ation. The significance of mediation and conciliation, our most
informal methods of dispute resolution, lies in the fact that the
"solution achieved is acceptable to the immediate parties to the
dispute and that it typically gives each party less than he originally
desired or felt was his due.'"27 When the method of dispute
settlement shifts from one of compromise to one of decision, 28 our
most important mechanism is arbitration, not the formal law
courts. This fact is largely overlooked by legal actors and writers.
The most common form of dispute resolution in our culture is
negotiated settlement. This might be accomplished in the wife-
husband dispute, for example, if the wife were to say to hef angry
three or more. They are, therefore, subject to the differing perspectives of a group of
people who often view the world differently than their colleagues. This gives the
individual judge a greater breadth of vision, and forces that judge to meet the arguments
of others while, at the same time, refining his own views.
26 The importance of determining whether a particular method is one of compromise
or of decision lies in the psychological attitude that accompanies the use of it. These
attitudes are significant on many levels. They determine the emotive connotations of
the process. Moreover, the emotive connotations of the process determine the context
and ways in which issues, facts, and results are accepted and interpreted.
Further, dispute settlement machinery is usefully classified according to the extent
to which it embodies the utilization of third persons and the extent to which it gives a
binding effect to decisions that are rendered by such third persons. Along these two
lines, the kind of machinery utilized by a particular group tells us something about the
commonality of value structure within the group and the extent to which the group,
as a group, actually perceives a need to settle disputes in any given area. See discussion
infra at 69-70.
27. Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 698 (1952).
28. We usually think of negotiation, mediation, or conciliation as examples of
methods of compromise. When the method of settling a dispute shifts from one of
compromise to one of decision, we tend to think of the courts and perhaps arbitration.
Decision refers to a formal, binding legal result determined by a third party. See
discussion infra at 70-72.
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husband, "I love you." Whether her statement has nothing or
everything to do with the underlying dispute,"' it is accepted, and
the dispute is resolved."'
A second form of dispute settlement is what we characterize as
third-party nonbinding intervention. This is, like negotiation, a
method of compromise. Here, an outsider steps in, either at the
request of the parties or on his own initiative, and the parties can
choose whether or not to do as he says. They do not agree
beforehand to abide by his decision. Third party nonbinding
intervention may take the forms of fact-finding, mediation, or
conciliation. For example, in our wife-husband dinner dispute, if
both parties agree to allow a third party, Joe, to counsel them
about the dispute, Joe may find facts and talk to each party
separately (mediate). This may or may not resolve a dispute.
The appearance of a third party, of course, changes the issues
and changes the flavor and emotional climate of the dispute.
People act differently and say different things when another person
enters the scene. Further, the notion of a negotiated "bargain"
and the emotive connotations of that word are evoked in the
process. People may be more willing to compromise their extreme
positions when a bargain situation is perceived as the relevant
one. This may also hold true for other forms of third party
settlement.
A third form of dispute settlement is binding third party
intervention. This is the point at which we normally think of
law-the legal matrix"-entering the scene. The existence of third
party binding adjudication reflects a combination of the group's
perceived need to require settlements in a given area and a
commonality of values among the members of the group. Such a
mixture of factors often results in the formulation of standards or
norms by which the dispute can be settled or, even absent such
29. It may have been, in fact, the unexposed issue in that dispute. Indeed, almost
every dispute has both a cognitive and emotive factor underlying the particular issue
in controversy. For a recognition of this by the Supreme Court in the first amendment
context, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
30. This type of resolution of a dispute-negotiated settlement-sometimes may be
replicated with multidimensional issues. In a strange way, when the legislature delegates
complex public problems to the agencies, the public, through the legislature, has agreed
to allow the agency to resolve disputes. Sometimes the resolution of such a dispute is
non-binding.
31, We tend to forget that the basis of negotiated settlement is also legal. Stated
otherwise, although the method of agreement or what is agreed on in negotiated
settlement may not have a legal matrix, the basis of making such a method operate is
legal.
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formulation, leads to decisions which will not be disruptively
violative of basic values of important sub-groups. To put it another
way, if one looks at the kind of dispute that is available to third
party binding adjudication, one can say that the group has either
a commonality of values or else a perceived need for maintenance
of group activity in the area covered by such disputes, or, more
likely, a combination of the two. Moreover, the greater the
perceived need for group activity in the area concerned, the more
likely it is that divergence of held values will not impede the
creation of institutionalized dispute-settlement machinery of a
third party binding character.
There are three general classes of binding third party resolutions:
arbitration, administrative or executive agency resolution, and
the residual, least used category, the courts. 2 When we refer to
arbitration, we mean private, consensual activity. This always
takes place within a legal frame of enforceability, both as to
compulsion to arbitrate, if the parties have agreed to do so, and
as to award. The essential aspects of arbitration are (1) it is
resorted to only by agreement of the parties; (2) it is a method
not of compromising disputes but of deciding them; (3) the person
making the decision has no formal connection with our system of
courts; but (4) before the award is known it is agreed to be final
and binding."' Inherent in the consensual character of the arbi-
tration process is the fact that its procedure can be adjusted to
fit the particular needs of the parties or the case. Moreover,
contrary to popular misconceptions, there are rules of evidence,
of procedure, and of presentation. 34 The rules simply differ from
those of our court processes. The decisional nature of arbitration
is what distinguishes it from the more informal types of settlement
processes and makes it similar to our court processes.
32. Curiously enough, court resolution of disputes is in some ways the most
important, and in other ways, the least important class of binding third party dispute
settlement mechanisms. In law school we spend most of our time looking at courts as
though they were the center of the universe, as if they took care of all legal disputes
in our nation. They are not, and they do not.
33. We do not include arbitration that is said to be "compulsory." That term
usually refers to a process of compelling parties by law to resort to a peaceful method
of settlement in which the decider is a person having no formal connection with our
system of courts. In pure arbitration contexts, the only semi-compulsive element is that
the award is final and binding, but this results only from the agreement of the parties.
34. Soia's studies on commercial arbitration reveal the procedures used in arbitration
settings. See, e.g., Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961),
reprinted in M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1968).
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Arbitration is the major decisional process for dispute settlement
in the United States. In a study undertaken in the early 1950's, :"
it was discovered that, if we lay aside accident cases and cases in
which government is a party, the matters going to arbitration
rather than to the courts represent at least seventy percent of our
total civil litigation. This trend has continued through the 1980's.""
Utilization of arbitration is perhaps best known in the labor
field. What most lawyers do not realize, however, is that arbitra-
tion has been the single most important third-party machinery
for adjusting commercial disputes between merchants. 7 Com-
mercial arbitration appears as a mechanism for dispute resolution
in three major institutional settings. These can be referred to as
the "ad hoc" arbitration, arbitration within the context of a
particular trade association or exchange, and arbitration within
administrative groups.
The simplest method of arbitration within the commercial
context has been the "ad hoc" or individuated method. This
occurs when two parties to a contract delineating a business
relationship agree to settle any disputes that may arise under the
35. Between 1955 and 1960, a series of research studies on the institutional and
decision making aspects of arbitration were undertaken under Soia Mentschikoff's
supervision. The studies focused on the basic question of how disputes are settled or
avoided in commercial groups.
The studies had three disparate and yet related aspects. The first aspect dealt with
why commercial groups on such a wide scale preferred their own institutions of law-
government to those theoretically available to them in the formal legal structure. The
second aspect dealt with what the kinds of law-government machinery in commercial
groups were, and whether they differed significantly from those in the formal legal
system. The third aspect dealt with how decisions settling disputes were made in the
commercial groups, and to what extent these processes were similar or different from
the processes normally used in the formal legal system. Most of the research data was
never published. During the spring of 1985, William Twining, Quain Professor of
Jurisprudence, University College, London, and I did a preliminary catalogue of Soia's
books and papers. Much of the important papers consisted of notes and very rough
drafts of materials related to this project. At present, we are attempting to locate the
remainder of the data collected during this period so that we can create a Soia
Mentschikoff collection. It should be noted that many of Soia's legal views are directly
related to the insights she gained from the research on this project.
36. Indeed, the courts are never utilized in most disputes, and of those civil cases
that enter the court system, about ninety percent are settled before trial. Galanter,
Worlds of Deals. Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL ED. 268, 269
(1984). In criminal cases, which are handled exclusively by the courts, between eighty
and ninety percent of all cases are settled without trial. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27 (1984).
37. The dominance of arbitration in settling disputes between merchants explains
why there are so few cases that do not involve consumers under Article II of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Also, arbitration has very limited review in the courts.
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contract by resort to arbitration, before either named arbitrators
or persons to be named at the time of the dispute. The making
of arrangements, including the procedures for arbitration, rests
entirely with the parties concerned.
In the second type of arbitration setting, within the context of
a particular trade association or exchange, the group establishes
its own arbitration machinery for the settlement of disputes among
its members, either on a voluntary or non-voluntary basis. The
group sometimes makes the arbitrating machinery available to
nonmembers doing business in the particular trade. A particular
association may also have specialist committees that are investi-
gatory in character, leaving the arbitration machinery to handle
only the private disputes involving nonspecialist categories of
cases.
The third setting for commercial arbitration is found in ad-
ministrative groups, such as the American Arbitration Association,
the International Chamber of Commerce, and various local cham-
bers of commerce. These groups provide rules, facilities, and
arbitrators for any persons who wish to settle disputes by arbitra-
tion. Further, trade associations with insufficient business to
warrant creation of their own dispute settlement machinery often
make arrangements with these groups to deal with disputes that
arise among their members.
A second form of binding third-party resolution occurs in
decisions made by administrative agencies. Many of the federal
administrative agencies make binding decisions on important
public issues which may never be decided by a court. These
agencies can also decide private disputes. For example, the
National Labor Relations Board can act at the request of a union
and can settle a dispute between the union and the employer,
both private groups. Administrative agencies can also settle actions
brought by the government against a private group or a private
person and those brought by a private person against the govern-
ment. The decisions of administrative agencies can be reviewed
by courts, but only in limited circumstances."
Courts, in effect, get what is left over. On the public side,
much of the court caseload is concerned with criminal cases.
Much of this is constitutionally mandated. Many appellate courts
38. For the standard and scope of judicial review of administrative agency actions,
see generally K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, chs. 28-30 (3d ed. 1972). The review
in the courts of administrative agency decisions is much broader than it is of arbitration.
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also deal with reviewing administrative agency decisions. Courts
do not, however, settle most of the disputes that arise in our
society.:
This discussion of dispute settlement mechanisms obviously
suggests certain consequences for the lawyer. Much of law and
much of lawyering involves more than courtroom work and more
than knowledge about very narrow issues. Lawyers play pivotal
roles in all the mechanisms employed in dispute settlement.
Lawyers generally spend more time as counselors than as advo-
cates. As a counselor, a lawyer must do more than construct an
argument or cite a case. He must be knowledgeable about the
current state of the law and the changes in law over a particular
period of time. He must also have a "situational sense" for the
area in which he gives advice. A lawyer in a shipping case, for
example, is less than helpful if he does not understand the industry,
its practices, and the various resolutions of disputes made in the
past. He must be able to predict the results, both legal and
otherwise, of certain actions taken by his client. Further, a lawyer
must understand the makeup of the group with which he deals,
its goals, operations, and beliefs. In addition, if a dispute arises,
the makeup of the dispute settlement machinery must be well
known to the lawyer. Knowledge of the decisional model as well
as of the decision makers, are prerequisites to sound lawyering.
A competent lawyer must, therefore, be a universalist.""
39. See supra note 36.
40. Professor Llewellyn made this point in a somewhat different context as early
as 1930:
I stop at this place only to call your attention to one fact. It should be clear,
it should be clear even to the blind, that the work of business counsel is
impossible unless the lawyer who attempts it knows not only the rules of the
law, knows not only what these rules mean in terms of predicting what the
courts will do, but knows, in addition, the life of the community, the needs
and practices of his client-knows, in a word, the working situation which he is
called upon to shape as well as the law with reference to which he is called upon
to shape it. It has seemed to some students in the past that they had come to
law school to "learn the law," and that the law was made up of legal rules
and nothing more, and that all other matter was irrelevant, was an arbitrary
interference with their proper training for their profession. I have been told by
some that social science was for social scientists, in the graduate school; that
what law students wanted was the law. I have met with resentment, sometimes
bitter, at the so-called cluttering up of our law curriculum with so-called non-
legal material. If I have made my point just now it should be clear to you that
this is the language of men who do not see far enough beyond their noses to
measure even their own job in life. If I have made my point it should be clear
that for most lawyers the job of advocate is half, nay, less than half the job
they have to do. Even as advocate, I am prepared to argue, they need,
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B. Channeling and Rechanneling Behavior
A second major function of law in any legal system is the
channeling and rechanneling of the behavior of persons in our
society so as to achieve goals thought to be desirable by the
society. The structure for channeling and rechanneling behavior
has both substantive and procedural aspects. The questions raised
are what behaviors are appropriate, how we determine what the
behavior should be, and who decides what the appropriate behavior
is for any given situation. These decisions are made in both
binding and nonbinding modes.
1. Nonbinding Mode
The nonbinding mode, which is informal, is used in many
groups, including the family. For example, lawmaking occurs in
the family when the head of a family controls a child's behavior
by saying, "In our family, we do it this way, and I don't care
what anybody else says, that's how we do it in our family. If you
wish to be a member of our family, do what I say." This is a
prime example of controlling and channeling behavior. The
message is clear. If someone is to be a member of the group, that
individual will do things as the group does them. Members of
the family always have the option of revolting and leaving the
family by going out into the world.'
It is the ability to ostracize that gives the informal, small group
its cohesiveness and power, and allows it to function. There is,
however, a safety valve for those ostracized: they may reassimilate
with the group. Reassimilation is always possible in the nonbinding
mode because of the notion of regroup. To understand this notion,
consider Professor Llewellyn's definition of home: "The place
where no matter what you did, when you got there they took
desperately, full knowledge of the facts of the life of the community, against
which law must play. But when it comes to their task as business counsel there
is no need for argument. The case is clear. The stones speak. What the courts
will do means nothing save in relation with how people are to act in the light
of the court's doing. For the meaning of the law in life and in the practice of
lawyers is its meaning not to courts, but to laymen.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 16-17 (1981).
41. This can, of course, make things easier for everyone concerned. It may, for
example, encourage independence by youth. This can lead a child to go out into the
world and to live and mature through such an experience. The parents may then be
able to keep whole the family structure. A child can also be reassimilated back into
the family at a later point. See discussion infra at 41-47. Perhaps everyone will then
have a healthier perspective on the family itself.
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care of you." Even if you were an outlaw in the larger group or
society, you reassimilated into the smaller family group when you
came home. The family, in effect, regrouped. The regroup is a
very important aspect of human life. Everybody has to have a
place or person like that. It is the absence of that kind of place
or person in people's lives that creates real alienation with all the
disastrous impacts that factor has on society.
Some larger groups, such as churches, channel and rechannel
behavior in the same nonbinding mode. Groups operating in this
mode rarely expel their members from the group. An exception
is excommunication, which was once popular with the Catholic
Church, but which has lost its popularity. This analysis leads us,
nicely enough, to a true story that exemplifies the larger group
in conflict and its attempt to channel and rechannel behavior.
A group of Pueblo Indians was once excommunicated from the
Catholic Church by a new Archbishop.' They were the Pueblo
Santo Domingo on the road between Sandoval and Albuquerque,
New Mexico."" When a new Archbishop came to Sandoval, he
was told by another Priest that the Pueblos, especially the Santo
Domingo Pueblos, would not go to confession and communion
to receive the sacraments, but they did go in for the other
sacraments. The new Archbishop said that would change; the
other Priest said the Pueblos would not change. The Archbishop
decided to visit the Pueblos and force them to change their
behavior. When he entered the Pueblo village on his burro, he
was treated with great respect. The Indians knelt and lit candles.
Not knowing the Pueblos very well, at a later point in his visit
the Archbishop stood and said: "My children, you must now go
to confession and communion, and, if you do not go, you leave
me with no choice but to excommunicate you." The Pueblos saw
the Archbishop out of the village in the same way as they had
greeted him, with reverence and love. They did not, of course,
go to confession or communion. Thinking he had no other choice,
the Archbishop excommunicated them.
This act did not adversely affect the Pueblos' views of the world
and their place within it. When the Indians were told they were
42. This story is based on Soia's experience with the Pueblo Indians. She spent a
great deal of time with Karl Llewellyn studying and living with these Indians. She had
the distinct honor of becoming a member of the tribe. More significantly, she became
the keeper of their cultural ways through preservation of some of their most significant
stories.
43. Sandoval is north of Albuquerque. The Santo Domingo Pueblo's territory runs
between Albuquerque and Santa Fe.
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excommunicated they simply said: "We buried and we married
before the Priest came, and now we know how to baptize. We
will survive." In the end, the Archbishop lifted the excommuni-
cation.
The Pueblos were a small group with their own notions of
weakness. In this example, each side had taken a hard line
position. There were two regroups in conflict, and the resolution,
as usual, was done by settlement. The Pueblos reassimilated the
Archbishop, and through him the Church, while the Archbishop,
and through him the Church, reassimilated the Pueblos. There
was nothing legal in this in the sense of it being involved in what
we think of as a formal legal system. It was all very legal, however,
in- terms of the actions of the internal groups and the resolution
of the dispute. " Behavior was channeled and rechanneled.
Such a change of behavior and the regroup operates in other
large groups. Another example is the New York Stock Exchange
group. ' In the 1950's, when the Exchange was still being run by
its members, and professional staff had not yet appeared on the
scene, the members characterized themselves as gentlemen. If one
were not a gentleman, one could not be a member of the Exchange.
They put it that bluntly.
A gentleman was said to have certain inherent characteristics,
one of which being that he told the truth to other gentlemen. In
hearing after hearing, the Member Committee on Grievances
would ask the member being accused of some unacceptable conduct
whether he had done the dreaded act, and, inevitably, the accused
would answer that he had done the act. At that point, he would
be denounced for having performed "wicked" acts and told that
he had to do whatever it was they wanted him to do to retain
his membership in the Exchange. If he did what was asked, he
was reassimilated into the group.
Obviously, there are significant differences between the Ex-
change and Pueblo examples. In the Exchange example, we are
viewing an internal, coherent group dealing with itself. In the
Pueblo example, we see outside cultural forces intruding upon
the traditions of Indian life. Despite the differences, these examples
44. This example can perhaps be classified as one in between the binding and
nonbinding modes. It is a complex example because it involves a group within a group
and two separate regroups.
45. As part of the Arbitration Project she headed in the 1950's, Soia Mentschikoff
was permitted to witness the actions of internal committees of the New York Stock
Exchange. See supra note 35.
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show striking similarities. Both show the internal nonbinding
settlement mode and the regroup. Both employ the method of
negotiated settlement. Both channel and rechannel behavior. "
2. Binding Mode47
The binding mode of channeling and rechanneling behavior
operates under the formal law of the nation and of the States.
Operating over all in the channeling and rechanneling of behavior
is the Constitution, which sits like a brooding omnipresence over
the other formal laws. Beneath the Constitution in the channeling
of behavior in the binding mode are statutes (passed by state
legislatures and Congress), rules and regulations of the executive
departments, agency and administrative regulations, and, of course,
printed decisions of the courts and other bodies.
Arbitrators and agencies also make rules about how people
ought to behave by way of separate decision. 48 For example, in
the labor field, the National Labor Relations Board publishes
decisions. A labor jurisprudence has developed from these prec-
edents. Any agency, to the extent it prints its own decisions, or
t0 the extent newspapers print them, establishes a jurisprudence
that may affect behavior. In commercial arbitration, on the other
46. The Pueblos dealt with dishonorable behavior in a manner somewhat similar
to the people involved with the Exchange. When confronted with an accusation, a
member of the Pueblos would confess and face his punishment in order to be reassimilated
into the group. One punishment utilized was to force the wrongdoer to stand on his
knees continuously for several hours. The Exchange and the Pueblos differed in one
significant respect: the offending Pueblos were always reassimilated into the group,
while the Exchange kicked out a member on at least one occasion. This certainly says
something about the different values of each group, and perhaps it says something
about which group is more "civilized."
47. Perhaps nowhere in our law is the attempt to channel and rechannel behavior
in a binding mode more overt than in the criminal law. In both the definition of what
behavior is or ought to be criminal, and in the purposes of punishment, the criminal
law is engaged in affecting behavior. Further, there are gross differences in cultures on
their answers to these questions and, over time, cultural views change. By and large,
there is general agreement that "thou shalt not kill." There are, however, sharp
differences in punishments even for murder between cultures. When you look at other
types of behavior defined as criminal, there are extremely large differences between
cultures. In the United States, for example, perhaps more behavior is termed criminal
by statute than in any other country. Moreover, the theories for punishment range
from deterrence (both general and specific) to rehabilitation and retribution. Each of
the theories of punishment has different channeling and rechanneling purposes, and
each affects individuals somewhat differently.
48. Arbitrators and courts always move by decision making, and legislators always
move by formulating rules, while agencies can choose to move either by rule or decision.
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hand, nothing is printed. Except for the inside group that does
arbitration, there is not a jurisprudence equivalent to that in the
labor field. The affect on behavior from commercial arbitration
comes from the insiders, including lawyers, communicating the
precedents to the merchants.
Courts, of course, by their decisions, attempt to channel and
rechannel behavior. Court decisions, sometimes in the first in-
stance, but always in review, not only give us a precise ruling,
but also give us the becauses-the reasons the court reached its
result. Each court opinion always has two major characteristics
or becauses, the second one of which is not always expressed.
The first because is the doctrinal or technical reason for the
decision. The second because tells how the court perceived the
situation and why it thought whatever result it hoped to achieve
was a good result. The second because determines the prophecy
of what the court will do the next time. That is, the second
because reveals the court's perception of the situation. The second
because affects the behavior of lawyers, parties in the case, other
persons who are involved in the life situation, and other courts.
It may even affect certain aspects of the larger civilization. The
second because tells us what type of behavior ought to take place
and how.
For any of these decisions, for any of these rules or regulations,
for any of these statutes, and even for any part of the Constitution
to have any effect whatever on anybody's behavior, the law has
to be communicated to the relevant party. If one function of the
law is to channel and rechannel behavior, then surely the law
should be concerned with how to bring that information to the
person whose behavior is involved. It is important, therefore, to
know how law gets communicated to the persons whose behavior
it is supposed to affect. 49 If that law is never communicated, it is
never going to have an effect. On the other hand, if it is
communicated inaccurately, it may have very peculiar effects.
Very little is known about this process of communication. Yet
its importance to the proper functioning of our society cannot be
49. Not all law affects everybody, though some law does. Some laws affect only
particular groups. Thus, for example, Articles III and IV of the Uniform Commercial
Code were written stylistically for bank clerks, so that they would know what to do
with the various pieces of paper that came across their desks. The effort was to
communicate through teaching in bank clerks' language. The Code in its entirety was
written for merchants, so that they could read it, understand it, and know when they
had to consult a lawyer.
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overestimated. Indeed, the significance of it was strikingly illus-
trated when both Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Powell
lamented the press coverage of Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale. ' In
Gannett, the Supreme Court held that an order of the trial court
that excluded the press and public from a pretrial suppression
hearing in a criminal case did not run afoul of the first, sixth,
and fourteenth amendments. The trial court order excluding the
press was based upon an unopposed defense motion. The trial
judge, in reaching his conclusion to exclude the press from the
hearing, found "that an open suppression hearing would pose a
'reasonable probability of prejudice to [the] defendants.' "" The
Supreme Court majority held that neither the press nor the public
have any right of access to pretrial proceedings stemming from
the sixth amendment, and assuming that there was some right to
attend the proceedings stemming from the first amendment, the
right of the defendants to a fair trail under the facts of this case
outweighed that first amendment right.
A great deal of controversy arose in the press and in the lower
federal courts concerning the applications of Gannett to trials. The
decision caused so much uncertainty that, in a rare public
statement, Chief Justice Burger stated that judges who were
barring the press and the public from trials might be misreading
the decision because they read press accounts of the case instead
of the Supreme Court opinion."2 Mr. Justice Powell also claimed
50. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
51. Id. at 376.
52. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1979, at A17, col. 1. Chief Justice Burger claimed that
the opinion referred to pretrial proceedings only. Id. He specifically stated that judges
were reading newspaper reports of what the Court said, rather than the Court's majority
opinion that the press and public may be barred from pretrial hearings at the request
of the accused. Further, he claimed that, "[U]nder the decision, the defendant may
waive his right to a public trial only if the prosecution agrees." Id.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, in concurring with the majority ruling, suggested
that the press and public might be barred from a criminal trial. 443 U.S. at 397, 403
(Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring). But Chief Justice Burger wrote a concur-
rence to the majority opinion making clear it applied only to pretrial proceedings. Id.
at 394.
The New York Times, reporting on the controversy, cited a survey by the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press showing that principals in thirty-nine cases around
the country had urged judges to close trials to the press or public, or both. "A judge
in Westminster, Md. closed an entire trial to the public and the press last month,
citing potential embarrassment to witnesses, and a Federal judge in New York City
even barred the public from a sentencing at the conclusion of a trial," N.Y. Times,
Aug. 9, 1979, at A17, col. 1.
"Judges in West Virginia, South Carolina and New York have made another
distinction-they have barred the press from court proceedings but allowed the public
in." Id. Poor communication resulted in a violation of constitutional rights and a major
social disruption of our courts.
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that the press's misstatement of the holding of Gannett resulted in
district court judges excluding the press from trials. The interesting
point about the Gannett decision and its application to trials, for
our purposes, was the perception of these two Justices that district
court judges learned their law from newspaper accounts and not
from Supreme Court opinions. "
Thus, one of the things it would be desirable to know is where
district court judges obtain their information about the law. Their
behavior, like that of the other actors in the legal culture, is
supposed to be channeled and rechanneled by decisions of higher
courts. The proliferation of the possible questions and results from
an inquiry of this sort, in a wide variety of areas, may well raise
a number of challenges for the legal profession.
Where does the general public-the largest group whose be-
havior is sought to be modified by law-receive their knowledge
of law? There are several sources from which they may obtain
legal knowledge. They may obtain it from the broadcast media,
which limits the time spent on many topics to sixty seconds. They
may turn to the newspapers, which print stories only if they are
dramatic and can be made exciting, sometimes at the cost of
accuracy or depth. Finally, they may obtain their legal knowledge
from their lawyers, who may not have accurate knowledge them-
selves or simply lack the ability to communicate intelligibly what
they do know. All of these communication devices may be
deficient. Indeed, the lawyer is often a large part of the com-
munications gap.
Not only do many lawyers lack substantive knowledge about
the law, but they also fail to understand the very processes of the
law that are necessary to the just resolution of their client's
problems. Knowledge matters enormously here; it is the most
important commodity one can acquire in law school and in
practice. But legal education is part of the problem. Law students
are not taught the art of learning how to acquire knowledge. This
problem is then compounded in law practice. Most lawyers know
a little about a very small area. The universalist, however, knows
a little about everything, and, more importantly, the universalist
knows how to find out about what he or she does not know.
Further, the universalist knows how to put all the information
53. The phenomenon of judges not reading carefully the higher court's opinions,
but relying on a newspaper account or another lawyer's discussion of those opinions,
is more common than we generally assume. Even if.this only happens once, however,
it is once too often.
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together. The universalist has been the trademark of our profes-
sion. The universalist should continue to be our trademark.
C. Allocation of the Final Say
1. Overview
The third major function of law, allocating the final say, arises
necessarily from the functions of settling disputes and channeling
and rechanneling behavior. Decisions about what behaviors should
be encouraged, and how particular matters or those that affect
more general situations should be decided, must ultimately be
entrusted to somebody. We must decide which bodies are best
suited to the performance of these tasks. '
First, in analyzing this question, we must determine which
disputes a legal system should be concerned with at all. Should
it be concerned, for example, with the wife and husband dinner
dispute, or should that problem be allocated to the private sector?
We could make a rule that any broken dates between spouses are
not of concern to the legal system. On the other hand, what
should the legal system do with disagreements arising from major
economic behavior? Are we going to say that this, too, should be
resolved in the private sector?
Second, once we decide that a legal institution should be
involved, we must decide which institution is appropriate. As
stated below, our legal culture employs a wide variety of mech-
anisms for settling disputes, ranging from the very informal and
private to the very formal and public processes. Our legal culture
also has many different theories concerning the advantages and
disadvantages of government regulation of private and public
issues." These theories, in turn, have translated into the systems
54. This is a very complex and difficult question which the legal profession in this
country has not faced in any direct and systematic way. We have not faced the question
of its centrality-the nature of the thing being allocated.
55. Lawyers must be aware of these theories and understand them thoroughly to
represent adequately their clients on particular issues. In the twentieth century two
public philosophies have struggled for dominance in our culture. We usually call one
"conservative" and the other "liberal." Both "theories" give coherence to the world;
they give explanations about our history and form the core for creating solutions to
pressing public issues. For example, on public economic issues, the conservative public
philosophy argues that for years America has been profligate. It continues by claiming
that we must restore discipline to the economy by making control of inflation a first
priority and by relegating unemployment to a much lower priority. Further, the
conservative philosophy argues that we must control government spending either by
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of adjudication and decision. Proponents of freedom from regu-
lation argue that the best way to achieve wise dispute settlement
in these systems of adjudication and decision is through the
adversary system; proponents of protective legislation or regulation
focus on a parental investigatory system of adjudication in law-
making.
2. Decision-Making and Rule-Making Models
Third party dispute-settling machinery that is binding upon the
disputants is not all of the same type. There are two primary
models1 6 that represent the variety of structures found in our legal
requiring a balanced budget or by allowing the free market to reward successful
entrepreneurialism and to punish failure. It continues by claiming that we must stop
stagnation by freeing up financial power so that it can be used by creative individuals.
The market, rather than taxes or government regulation, is seen as the source of social
discipline.
The "liberal" public philosophy takes a somewhat different approach to public
economic problems. It argues that economic policy should favor full employment, even
at the cost of some inflation. In this perspective, joblessness is seen as a terrible burden
to impose on anyone. Inflation can be controlled by income policy that will cause no
increase in unemployment.
Both philosophies, of course, have somewhat different views on the nature of man
and the role of government. These views translate into the legal system's use of models
to resolve disputes-the adversarial and the investigatory models. Just as in the legal
models used for dispute resolutions, neither public philosophy is pure. Yet each view
must be understood by the lawyer. He must integrate both perspectives into the lenses
he wears to view public issues. Only in this way can he create the correct resolutions
for disputes.
Without understanding the realities underlying legal issues, lawyers may mislead
their clients. For example, the myth that has been created in our law relating to the
notion of freedom from regulations in the marketplace is the view that the history of
the common law has been one from total freedom to government regulation. That is
complete and utter bilge. We have moved from high regulations to relative freedom,
back to greater regulations, and we are now in the process of returning to more freedom
in some areas but even greater regulation in other areas. Most legal obligations in the
common law rested on status, not contract. Further, contract did not wholly free
individuals to bargain out of their status. Even today, all contracts have some kind of
status left over. Look at the typical lease. It has boiler plate provisions recognizing the
landlord's higher status, and very few tenants are able to change the lease provisions.
Lawyers must understand this or clients will be harmed.
56. There is also a third model: the umpire system. This is a system under which
typically a single person is entrusted to render a decision without the participation of
the parties. It is typified by four characteristics. First, the dispute itself has to be of
relatively small dimension with a relatively limited impact upon either the parties or
the rest of the group. Second, the standards or norms that are brought to bear by the
umpire in making his decision have to be articulated with relative clarity and have to
be congruent with the group's feelings about the appropriate standards. Third, a desire
for speedy settlement must be present. Fourth, and finally, the relevant facts must be
capable of personal ascertainment by the umpire. In the formal legal system, for
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system. These extreme models of the processes used in making
rules and decisions are the adversary and parental investigatory
systems. No system, however, is purely adversarial or purely
parental investigatory. In determining where a system lies on the
continuum, the proper question will always be: To what extent
is the system functioning more in the direction of one than in the
other?
a. Adversary System 7
If we are to accept the adversary system as a good system for
settlement of disputes, we must presume that the parties to the
dispute have relative equality of ability, knowledge, training, and
economic resources. The adversary model is typified by party
control over (1) whether the procedure should be utilized at all,
(2) what the issues presented for decision are, (3) what data should
be presented, and (4) what arguments should be presented. The
model presupposes that the parties know best what is relevant to
their positions, what happened in the past, and what impact any
decision would have in the future. It also presupposes that the
nature of the issues, data, and arguments to be presented can be
understood by the deciders, and that the system of selecting
deciders produces men and women who either have or can obtain
from the parties the knowledge requisite to wise decision.
The adversary system proceeds on the assumption that the
whole is not greater than the sum of its parts, and when each
disputant argues for himself or herself, it will create a whole view
of the problem. Thus, the parties to the dispute, those involved
in the life situation, and the greater society (the whole) do not
need representation by the judge. Further, it is assumed that the
judge is not clothed with rule-making power, but with decision-
making power only. In theory, if the parties are all equal, both
truth and justice will emerge.
"To the extent that any of these presuppositions fails in a
material aspect, the adversary system becomes inadequate as a
tool of dispensing justice.'""8 Clearly, there are problems with a
example, such decisions are made every day by traffic cops. Characteristically, this
type of dispute settlement disclaims all rule-making power in the umpire and, especially
in the commercial groups, this disclaimer typically is accurate. The chief value embodied
in this system is speed and economy of decision.
57. The courts, in the formal legal structure, and arbitration, in the commerical
group setting, provide the prototypes of this kind of system.
58. See supra note 34, at 847.
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system of dispute settlement which is dependent on assumptions
of party equality. Any thinking person knows that the suppositions
of equality of the parties is utter nonsense. There is not equal
ability and there never has been; people are not born alike.
Diversity is a great thing, and one of the things in which people
are diverse is ability. Moreover, we know that not everybody is
trained in the same way, nor do people have the same prior
experiences. Further, we know that we cannot depend on economic
resources being equal. This variety is good, because if we were
trained in the same way and had the same prior experiences and
economic resources, we would merely be clones of one another.
We would then see the world only through one set of lenses. All
of us would wear the same blinders.
The queer thing is the extent to which the formal legal system
has recognized, over the years, additional areas in which one or
more of these presuppositions about the adversary system is
materially non-existent. The other queer and interesting thing is
the extent to which, when the formal legal system has recognized
this, it has departed rather regularly from the adversary system
toward an investigatory system of justice. Of equal interest are
the areas in which either recognition or departure has not occurred.
Before moving to the prevailing models of investigatory systems,
it is useful to point out some of the ways in which our court
system, for example, itself departs from the adversary system
model. It must be remembered that the adversary system model
emphasizes party control and disclaims rule-making power in the
decider. Yet we all know that courts in fact have and do exercise
a great deal of rule-making power. We also know that courts can
and do decide cases on the basis of issues other than those
presented by the parties. Moreover, we know that courts can and
do supplement the data presented by the parties, not only by
resorting to the concept of "judicial notice," but also by resorting
to economic, sociological, legal, or psychological texts. Further,
the courts can and do supplement or disregard the arguments
which have been made by the parties. In fact, some courts have
even been known to supplement data presented by the parties by
directing personal inquiries regarding the subject matter to persons
wholly outside the formal proceedings before the court. The fact
is that when the value of wise decision, a term which we will
refer to again later in more detail,' is set against the value of
59. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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party control of the data bearing on decision, our courts have
frequently preferred the value of wise decision. But the one aspect
of an adversary system from which our courts have seldom, if
ever, departed is party control over the bringing of the dispute
to the court for decision. "(
b. Parental Investigatory System
Under the investigatory model, it is presupposed that the parties
will have unequal ability, knowledge, training, and economic
resources. Thus, there is a perceived need for the decider to
redress the inequality of the parties to assure that neither the
parties nor society incurs a loss. The decider is assumed to have
better knowledge, skill, and ability than the parties, and to know
best what is good for the parties."' Further, under this system,
the parties do not need to be intimately involved in presenting
data, because the decider undertakes the investigation. In sum,
under the parental investigatory system, it is assumed that the
state or private decider knows best. Moreover, the decider's
function is both to protect the weaker party and to make wise
decisions. Under the adversary system, of course, the parties are
assumed to know best.6
2
Basically speaking, the investigatory type of adjudicatory ma-
chinery is characterized by decider control rather than party
control over whether a dispute should be decided, over what issues
should be presented for decision, and over what data and argu-
ments should be advanced or utilized in decision. Typically, also,
in the investigatory type of machinery, the deciders have explicit
rule-making power. It can thus be said that the investigatory type
of machinery is a response to one or more of the following
situations: (a) the non-bringing of the dispute for third party
adjudication has resulted in some undesirable consequence to the
total group, or (b) the inequalities of the parties and their counsel
are of such regular and large dimensions as to produce either
60. This refers to civil, but not necessarily to criminal cases.
61. The corollary to this position is that the parties do not always know their own
best interests. For example, law school decisions about curriculum are often based on
the view that students do not know what is good for them. If some law students were
to demand a twelve credit course in trial advocacy, it is certain that most law school
faculties would likely deny that request. Most faculty members view themselves as
standing in loco parentis to students, and they usually believe that they know what is
best for students. Whether this is correct, of course, is another question.
62. This view is often rejected in the actual workings of our adversary system. See
supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
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condition (a) or to result in highly undesirable decisions, or (c)
the range of knowledge appropriate to wise decision is not readily
available in the normal course of procedure to the persons who,
in the normal course of events, will be selected as the deciders.
These three conditions are conditions whose existence, in our
opinion, goes a long way to explain the proliferation of admin-
istrative agencies in the United States.
It will be noted, however, that these conditions are all specifically
geared to what might be called the civil type of case. When, in
contrast, we take a look at what might be called the "criminal"
side of law, we see a different picture. The pure investigatory
type of structure employed in civil cases moves primarily on a
view of the necessity for wiser, in the sense of more expert,
decision. The criminal cases, on the other hand, move on either
an explicit or implicit idea of the importance of the value of
reassimilating an offender to the group. This type of system,
which Professor Llewellyn has called the "parental," ' has inter-
esting by-products, because it typically presupposes that the group
is more important than the individual and that the individual, as
a consequence, is the holder of an inferior status. Typically also,
because the decider makes the decision, after ex parte investigation,
as to when to haul the offender before him for reassimilation into
the group, it is reasonably clear that the guilt of the offender has
been assumed. The normal presumption of our criminal law that
a man is innocent until proven guilty, therefore, is reversed.
These investigatory parental procedures, which are found with
a relatively high degree of frequency among the ethics and business
practices committees of our commercial groups,"4 are by no means
without parallel in the formal legal structure. It will be remembered
that their basic characteristics stem from the importance of
bringing the offender back within the fold of the group and that
this characteristic depends upon a belief that the group is more
important than the individual. The glaring example of this
juxtaposition of purpose and belief is, of course, our juvenile
court. We find other echoes of this same set of values in some of
the Soviet trials and rather regularly in the courts of justice of
63. Karl Llewellyn coined this term in the 1930's, and he used to discuss this type
of system regularly with Soia Mentschikoff, particularly when discussing the law in
different cultures.
64. See supra text accompanying note 45 for an example of a business practice
committee in the New York Stock Exchange, and its use of the parental-investigatory
procedures.
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the Pueblo Indians. "' One of the interesting sidelights of the use
of this system, and one whose presence in the Soviet trials has
occasioned much adverse comment, is that because the deciders
generally believe that the offender is guilty, and because the
deciders generally wish to reassimilate the offender to the group,
the deciders rather regularly press for and obtain confessions.
This holds true for all the illustrations discussed above. The act
of confessing is viewed as a first step on the road to reassimilation."'
In our formal legal structure, many of our administrative
agencies exemplify the expert investigatory type of system. This
65. See generally K. LLEWELLYN & E.A. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). See
also supra note 46 for a discussion of the Pueblo Indians' system of justice.
66. The confession is employed as a useful tool for reassimilation in almost all
group life in which we engage. It is employed in the reassimilation of a family member
back into the family as well as in the reassimilation of a citizen back into the political
state. Further, the notion that confession is a positive act, and a first step on the road
to reassimilation into the group, is a central tenet of psychology and psychiatry, some
religions, and some systems of criminal law. For elaboration of these ideas, see J.
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 608-10 (1973).
The psychiatrist, psychologist, and counselor, for example, all view confession as
essential to the process of growth into maturity and acceptance of the human condition.
The repression of knowledge and desires is very harmful to growth and maturity. If the
goal of therapy is to allow people to accept themselves and others, and to understand
and view their true situations, then confession is essential to this process. It allows
people to accept knowledge and desires and, therefore, to understand their role in
groups, and in the larger society. Such understanding allows them to rejoin their groups
within the larger society, while viewing themselves as important parts of those groups.
Confessions are also very highly valued in the Western Christian religions. In some
churches, for example, confession is a necessary part of penance. Further, the confession
of desires is considered as important as the confession of behavior. Indeed, the person
who does not confess is said to be subject to the world of the damned. He cannot be
reassimilated into the group of those who are to be saved. If he confesses, however, he
is assured of reassimilation into the "correct" group.
Most criminal law systems also recognize the importance of confession for purposes
of growth and reassimilation into the group. In the People's Republic of China, for
example, the criminal process involves informal sanctions ranging in seriousness from
so called "criticism-education" by members of the local power elite, to so called
"struggle or speak-reason-struggle," which exposes the individual to intense and
vituperative criticism from those in attendance. The result of this severe, exhausting,
and humilating criticism is confession and repentance. See Cohn, The Criminal Process
in the People's Republic of China, 79 HARv. L. REV. 469, 490 (1966). This is an effort to
educate members of the society. It also allows reassimilation into the larger group-
the society. The purpose of criminal law is not upon crime control, but upon an
educational process in which confession plays a central role in the reassimilation of the
offender into the society.
The confession is sometimes viewed in our criminal justice system as a step towards
rehabilitation and is often rewarded as such. For example, the guilty plea is often seen
as a step in the rehabilitation of the defendant and is often rewarded by a lesser charge
and sentence than would be the case if the defendant demanded a trial for allegedly
committing the same acts. Further, our juvenile courts attempt to use confession as an
aid to reassimilation of the youth back into the greater society.
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system also exists in commercial groups. It predominates in
exchange groups. An example is the specialist committees the
exchange groups create, such as the Odd Lots Committee of the
New York Stock Exchange. In fact, if we view the term "dispute"
as including any controversy between substantial portions of the
membership of the relevant group, we can see that our legislative
bodies also use an investigatory method, though unfortunately
not always of an expert investigatory type. Even including legis-
lative groups in the investigatory system, however, we have yet
to encounter a machinery which has only the characteristics
envisaged by our model. The same is true, of course, of the
adversary system model.
Almost all existing machineries to some extent embody aspects
of both the adversary and investigatory models. These models are
important because they give us the wherewithal to question the
extent to which a particular machinery embodies either adversary
or investigatory system characteristics. This, in turn, allows us to
state to what extent the values embodied in such systems prevail
in the particular machinery under study. To put it another way,
we find that, as in the formal society, so, too, in the commercial
groups, the selection of particular kinds of machinery for the
settlement of particular kinds of disputes reflects the relevant
group's reconciliation of the conflict between the values repre-
sented by the two systems. For example, in the formal legal
system, although we believe firmly in the value of "freedom of
contract" and the freedom of a person whose contract has been
breached to take remedial action by bringing a case in the courts
or to refrain from doing so, we also recognize that certain kinds
of contracts cannot be left within the scope of the adversary
system. An example of such contracts may be service contracts
between public utilities and the consumers of power. The adversary
system may be perceived as an inappropriate one for resolving
disputes that may arise between these partie.s for at least two
reasons. First, because there is an obvious disparity between a
householder and a large public utility such as Consolidated Edison.
Second, because the type of knowledge necessary to a determi-
nation of the fairness of the contract can scarcely be supposed to
reside in judges who are selected by the processes currently in
use.
In the commercial groups, however, restoration of equality
between parties does not seem to have been a major operative
cause for the creation of investigatory tribunals. This may be
because the parties are more likely to be equal in their relations
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to the tribunal. The major reason for the creation of investigatory
tribunals in the commercial groups seems to lie in the felt need
to utilize specialized knowledge in the decisional process. This
matter of specialization or expert knowledge is, of course, an
extremely relative one. Arbitrators in trade associations or ex-
changes, by comparison to judges, would certainly be viewed as
experts on the issues brought to them for decision. Arbitrators
are not specialists, however, with respect to some areas of con-
troversy inside their own trade group. In that context they are
generalists as our judges are generalists. The issue in the utilization
of experts is the extent to which specialized knowledge not normally
available to the deciders is necessary to a wise resolution of the
kind of controversies likely to require decision. This question
cannot be answered without some knowledge of what the decisional
process is and what is meant by "wise" decision.
3. The Decisional Process: Wise Decision"7
Controversies or disputes are of two basic kinds. The first type,
and the one we think of as peculiarly suited to the "judicial"
process, involves a demand by some person against another for
compensation or change of behavior. The second type is a demand
by some person or sub-group for change in the standards regulating
the future behavior in some particular area of some or all of the
members of the group. Normally we think of this latter controversy
as best suited to the "legislative" process. In the first type of
dispute the conduct complained of typically has occurred in the
past or is threatened specifically for the future. Although this
factor is also present in the second type of controversy, typically,
its presence is obscured by emphasis on the necessity for creating
more just standards against which to measure or channel future
behavior. So, too, controversies of the first type obviously involve
the use of standards against which to measure behavior, and they
also involve the channeling of future behavior to the extent they
have precedential value. This fact tends to be obscured, however,
by the emphasis on the need to decide the particular controversy
on the particular facts.
67. For examples of in-depth analyses and empirical studies of decision making and
decision consensus in the commercial arbitration area, see, e.g., Haggard & Mentschikoff,
supra note 2, at 277 (setting out results of research regarding "how individuals make
decisions and how groups achieve decision consensus"); id. at 295 (examining "decision-
making and decision consensus phases" of dispute settlement).
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If we recognize that the resolution of all controversy involves
both fact-finding and standard ascertainment, we can see that the
resolution of the issues in any particular controversy turns on
either what factually has occurred or is likely to occur, or on
what norm or standard should be applied to judge or channel or
rechannel the conduct involved. On the other hand, the issue can
and frequently does involve both aspects-that is to say, the
factual and the normative. The particular issue or issues depend
on the areas of disagreement between the parties and the accept-
ance of those areas by the decider in framing the controversy.
Decision, therefore, if it is to be wise, necessarily involves the
selection of the most appropriate substantive norm possible and
its application to a correctly perceived set of facts.
Contrary to general belief, the selection of a norm does not
depend upon "the facts" but upon the issue,"' and "the facts"
instead depend upon the norm. To the extent that the norm is
improvidently selected or the facts are inaccurately perceived, the
decision which ensues is not the "wisest decision" that could have
been reached. Both the selection of a norm and the perception of
facts, however, are extremely complex processes. Neither the
selection of a norm nor the factual perception rests on ultimate
truth. In both cases, an assessment of certain probabilities is
involved: (a) that the norm selected is the one that will best serve
the relevant group's values and achieve the end desired, and (b)
that the facts as perceived are the facts which exist in reality.
The decider's prior experience and training have material
influence both on his selection of data from which a picture of
the facts can be developed and his selection of the appropriate
norm to be used in deciding a particular case. It is easy to
understand why selection of evidence rests on prior experience
and training. Obviously, for example, to a mechanic, a discourse
on carburators has a very different meaning than the same
discourse would have to the typical law professor. The factual
framework or Gestalt which each brings to bear to the study of
the evidence is necessarily different. The effect of prior experience
and training on the selection of a norm is more difficult to see
because it embodies two aspects, of which only one is generally
recognized. The generally recognized aspect is that as a result of
growing up and being educated in a particular cultural context,
we grow to assume the importance of certain values usually
68. Id.
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without further inquiry. This is easy to see. The other aspect is
that the determination of the wisdom of a particular norm is
always made, on an implicit or explicit basis, after an assessment
of the probable consequences that utilization of that norm will
have on the behavior of the members of the group to which it
applies. This latter phenomenon is obviously a factual inquiry,
and yet we tend to view it as a value judgment and consequently
beyond empirically based criticism.
It is thus apparent that the process of estimating factual
probabilities, whether as to past or future conduct, is an extremely
important part of any decisional process. It is also clear that the
more we know about the kind of conduct underlying the dispute,
the more likely we are to make an accurate estimate both as to
what probably has happened, and as to the impact the selection
of one norm or rule rather than another will have on future
conduct. The ability of a decider to utilize knowledge and expe-
rience directly related to the kind of controversy involved is,
therefore, one important factor in moving toward the achievement
of wise decision.
The other thing to be noted about the decisional process is that
the norms of rightness and wrongness themselves operate as
screens or filters for the perception of fact. This is necessarily so
because the human mind cannot carry all of the data before it as
to anything, but necessarily selects that which it believes to be
significant for the purpose at hand. Moreover, significance for
the purpose at hand rests on the standard by which the conduct
in the controversy is to be judged or channeled.
The question of how to achieve wise decision, therefore, becomes
in the first instance one of how to set up a system that will
produce deciders who will have the requisite knowledge-by virtue
either of prior experience or of on-the-job training-to select and
use the most relevant substantive norms and fact-finding norms.
This does not mean, however, that specialist or expert deciders
are the best means for the production of "wise" decision. A
person who is a mere specialist may not have adequate background
or training for the selection of appropriate substantive norms
which are good for all of us. Nonetheless, a mere specialist may
be excellent in the application of fact-finding norms and even in
the selection of substantive norms for the resolution of controversy
in the particular area involved. What is good for General Motors
need not be good for the entire country. The allocation of the
forum for ultimate norm selection is the age-old problem of the
allocation of function or area between generalist and specialist
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and is exemplified by current discussions of the relation that
should prevail between courts and administrative agencies.' 9
This issue is clearly related to the procedures being used by
particular types of tribunals. If the procedures can be altered so
as to permit ready access of specialized knowledge to generalist
deciders, perhaps that is a better solution than changing the forum
of decision. Certainly it is an alternative that needs further
exploration than it has yet received.
What this suggests, is that we must re-examine all of our
procedures-court, administrative, legislative, and executive-to
see the extent to which they facilitate wise decision in the particular
areas concerned, and the extent to which they embody values
other than those inherent in producing the wisest decisions pos-
sible. The study of this conflict of values and its variety of
resolution is one that seems to us to be as perennial as the conflict
itself, and as incapable of final resolution in any general form.
III. GRIST FOR THE MILL
The need for knowledge in all its forms, including the study of
disputes, the channeling and rechanneling of behavior, and the
allocation of the final say, is a prerequisite for an artist in law.
Without this knowledge the lawyer, his client, and the greater
society will always be less than they could be. Indeed, our failure
to train lawyers in the correct way is an abdication of our
responsibilities as citizens of our society.
All of what we have said, therefore, has enormous meaning for
lawyers and law students. It means that they must acquire
knowledge not only about the rules of law, the ways and processes
of the formal legal system, and the way people think, but that
they must also acquire knowledge about how things interact with
each other-how institutions interact, how forces interact, and
how people's dreams and desires interact. They also have to face
the possibility that, although everybody in our culture may have
a similar set of values, and we believe that they do on the whole,
the differences lie in the hierarchy set up of the values at any
given moment for any given situation. Stated otherwise, many of
69. So, too, the allocation of forum is a major problem in the relations between
the generalist bodies of commercial groups and their specialist committees.
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the differences lie not in differences in value at all, but are
differences in the perception of the life situation." '
Let us take, as an example of the need for broad knowledge,
the decisional process. 7 As stated below, in a court or arbitration
process, the search for justice always proceeds through the inves-
tigatory-parental mode, even if it is also adversarial in nature.
There is always the possibility that the decider will do independent
research on the issues presented for decision. The court is never
limited to the law presented by the parties or to the situational
facts as presented. Deciders, if they are conscientious about their
tasks, also usually wish to know as much of the situation as
possible. They are limited, however, by time and energy con-
straints.
Moreover, in any case which is worth fighting about to begin
with, good judges can find a technically impeccable way of deciding
for either party. If the judges are decent human beings, and we
think ninety-nine percent of them are, they are trying to find the
best solution for all of us. To achieve that end, they must
understand the life situation and know whether it is aberrant or
typical. If the judges are to have this information from each
advocate's perspective, the attorneys for the parties must under-
stand the situations and all their possible ramifications, and present
them to the judges in the light most favorable to their clients.
But if this task is not performed adequately by each party to the
dispute, the judges will most likely have their vision of the problem
severely constricted. In the typical case, judges simply lack the
70. One can see this dramatically by reading opinions of (he Supreme Court of the
United States or the supreme court of any particular state. If cases are read horizontally,
in a chronological order, on whatever topics arise in that order, and not vertically by
doctrine, we suggest that what one will find is that the biggest difference among the
Justices is in their perception of the life situation. Further, we think that one needs to
read just one term of cases to see this difference very, very clearly. While reading the
cases, one should ask: How does the writer of this opinion perceive the life situation,
and is that perception different from the writer of another opinion? If so, there is
obviously something operating on the value side, because it is certainly not operating
in terms of the prior law which, of course, remains constant. The other thing to look
for in the Supreme Court opinions is where the Justices are obtaining their information
about the life situation. Perception is never complete, and no one ever sees anything
entirely in the round. The lenses through which one sees the life situation can come
only in three ways: prior experience, training, or knowledge acquired on the job.
Indeed, we have taught classes using this very approach, and we believe that the results
of the classes strongly support our position. The groundbreaking work on appellate
advocacy which is suggestive of such an approach is K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION (1960).
71. See Haggard & Mentschikoff, supra note 2.
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time to put the case together from all perspectives without counsel's
help.
Our system of selecting judges assures that they do not know
a great deal about everything, or about anything in particular.
For example, it is highly unlikely that federal district court judges
will know anything about commercial finance, mergers and take-
overs, secured lending, or sales. Judges are not expected to know
these things. They are selected because they have good sense, are
quick studies, and are competent to be jacks-of-all-trades. The
theory is that they can find out quickly; they can be filled in by
lawyers. That is the skill for which they are selected, if they are
selected properly.72 In a sense, they are universalists, having a
little bit of knowledge about everything, but not a great deal of
knowledge about anything that is substantive in nature, except
possibly the specific areas in which they practiced before assuming
the bench.
It is terribly important when one has a good, conscientious
judge, therefore, to present to that particular judge the situational
patterns. The ability to provide this information is essential.
Lawyers must know what to give the judge, but they cannot do
so without broad knowledge. Lawyers not only must possess broad
knowledge of the situation, but they must also know how judges
determine facts so that they can convince judges to make good
decisions and select the correct rules.
For example, lawyers must understand something about the
decision making process. The decision making process proceeds
through stages. The first question that is pursued in either
arbitration or in the courts is a determination of what actually
happened in the particular case-who was doing what to whom,
when, how, why, and where? The second question is whether
what happened in the particular case is what usually happens in
that kind of case. This is what we call situational credibility. The
third question is the degree of credibility possessed by the purveyor
of the information. We call this personal credibility.
The way to judge situational credibility, or whether what
happened in the particular case is what happens ordinarily, is to
look to the inherent probability of the story which is being told.
Unless you know what is typical, you cannot know the inherent
72. Judges are not, of course, always selected properly. Many judges, as well as
many lawyers, are simply insufficiently prepared to do their jobs. This stems both from
inadequate training and disinterest in the job.
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probabilities of it. Many people know what the inherent proba-
bilities are as far as car accidents are concerned, and that is why
juries are good fact finders in automobile accident cases. If a
lawyer shows the jury the physical damage and skid marks, the
jury usually will make a fairly accurate guess about what happened
on the basis of sheer probability.
On the other hand, imagine that a buyer is suing a seller
because goods he bought were damaged when they fell out of the
delivery truck outside of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the
contract was CIF73 London-Albuquerque. That should sound
strange to a lawyer. Indeed, it is strange. A CIF contract is an
overseas contract, and Albuquerque is a long way from the coast.
The goods came from the coast by truck. Also, with a CIF
contract, the buyer pays against the shipping documents. In this
case, the buyer had already paid for the goods long before they
fell off the truck. He unloaded the vessel, put the goods on the
truck, and now he is complaining against the seller. It does not
make any sense, does it? The inherent probability is that the
buyer is lying, because the situation is just so nonsensical that it
could not be true.
The problem is that not many people in our society stop and
think about this or other problems that arise in life. Moreover,
not many lawyers or judges know much about CIF, anyway. A
lawyer, to be competent, must stop and think deeply about
problems such as this. The first and most important test that can
be given to any testimony or any delineation of any situation is
that if it does not make sense, it probably is not so. The world
is not eccentric; it moves with regularity. People usually behave
the same way today, tomorrow, and the next day. With the
exception of random acts of violence, such as terrorism, things
are fairly well-patterned. Absent patterns of behavior, the world
could not operate. This is also true about the law. Eighty percent
of the law is regular, well-patterned, and clear.'4 Only approxi-
mately twenty percent of the law is subject to quick change.
The second factor in gauging credibility is the kind of person
making the statement. With experts, we look to qualifications.
73. A CIF term indicates that the price includes "the cost of the goods and the
insurance and freight to the named destination." U.C.C. § 2-320(i) (1978).
74. A simple example is the everyday check cashing procedure. When someone
signs on the back of a check, that person is said to endorse it. If that check is not paid,
it "bounces" back to that person. That is the law. Further, the possible exemptions
to that law are infinitesimal when one considers the billions of checks that are cashed
each day.
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Without discussing in detail what considerations are important in
the process of qualification, we will say that anyone with a Ph.D.
has a union card. If the case requires information about economics
and the witness has a Ph.D. in microeconomics, he is viewed as
an expert. Otherwise, he is not an expert, but just an ordinary
Joe and jack-of-all-trades like the rest of us. In that case, what
he has to say is worthless, even if he is right and the "expert"
is wrong.
Factors beyond possession of a Ph.D. also affect the credibility
of experts. For example, if an economist specializes in a narrow
area such as market theory and has testified in a number of cases
in the past, it may add to his credibility. On the contrary, if a
doctor does the same thing-works on the same kinds of cases all
of the time and is a famous "expert witness"-we may think that
particular doctor is a phony. That may be grossly unfair to the
medical profession, or it may be that we hold this view because
we know more about medicine than we do about economics.
Calling in an expert does not dispense with the need to
understand the situation independently of the expert's testimony.
A lawyer has to know enough to know whether what the expert
is saying makes any sense at all. A lawyer cannot accept testimony
as fact just because the expert says it is so.
The law is universal and covers all parts of life, every last bit
of it. Lawyers must acquire the habit of being jacks-of-all-trades,
just as good judges are. They must be able to shift lenses when
different problems arise, so that they have a holistic view of the
problem. They should be able to get into any issues that arise in
our civilization. Further, lawyers should never believe anything
until it has been proven sufficiently to feel right. We use the word
feel, because there is a rightness about some kinds of feel. One
never reaches that point, however, until one has first gone through
the rational process. Feelings are useful in lawyering only after
there is a broad basis of knowledge behind the feelings.7 Thus,
75. Soia Mentschikoff always cautioned first year students about allowing their
feelings to override their intellect. She used to tell them to put aside their feelings until
they learned to work problems through the rational process. The first year of law
school, in her view, required a withholding of one's beliefs. Indeed, I vividly remember
Soia's constant denouncement of "feelings" when I was a first year student in her
Elements class at the University of Chicago. She often refused to discuss a student's
"feelings" until the student had first shown the class a rational thought process. This
could, of course, cause great tension among the students. It did make the point,
however, and students usually learned to combine the rational and the emotional aspects
of their thought processes.
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for example, unless an "expert's" testimony feels right, we should
question it critically despite the aura of personal credibility that
exists because of the expert's personal qualifications.
Another problem inherent in depending upon credibility of the
person, rather than of the situation, is that we all possess the
dreadful stereotypes that have been imposed upon us by the media
and by our culture. For example, take the stereotype of the
"perfect judge." If we say to a group of people that the door
opened and a small, fat man with greasy hair and perspiration
pouring down his face entered dressed in a black robe and scuttled
over to the bench and sat down with his eyes moving in all
directions, what would people say? Most likely, they would say:
"Hey, that is a queer judge, isn't he?" But, if we say to this
same group of people that a tall, distinguished, silver-haired man
entered the room with his black robe flowing in back of him and
smiled, what would most people say? Most likely, they would
say: "Justice is going to prevail because he looks like a judge."
These are two possible stereotypes. Everyone has stereotypes.
Lawyers must be aware of the perceptions people have of one
another and understand them. Lawyers must also be cognizant
of the stereotypes they possess.
The only two ways to determine credibility of information is
by the person or by the situation. If we determine credibility of
information solely by the personal characteristics of the purveyor,
we are not necessarily being rational. The more knowledge we
have about various topics, the more likely we are to be correct
about any given situation, and the more likely we are to be able
to make a better judgment as to what happened or is about to
happen.
The discussion above is addressed not only to the need for
knowledge in resolving disputes. Knowledge is also vital in the
area of channeling and rechanneling behavior. When we try to
control behavior, we start with the end or the value involved and
then state what type of behavior we want to elicit. We say that
we want people to behave in a particular way, because it will
achieve some end or value which we hold dear. This necessarily
involves some presupposition that we know what behavior will
result from our actions.
As previously noted, the first thing that must be done to channel
and rechannel behavior is to convey knowledge to the immediate
parties and, on a wider basis, to the general audience involved
in the life situation. We must rethink our method of conveying
knowledge about what ought to be, and about how people should
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behave, because it is being conveyed now in a very fragmentary
fashion. No one in the media, for example, explains the interre-
lationship of the various factors involved in any situation. People
are left unable to put together fragmentary information into a
whole view of important public problems.7"
As a society, we also suffer from lack of knowledge due to lack
of data. This has significant consequences. For example, there
are many areas in which our society has inadequate knowledge,
such as on environmental issues. The state of the art and of
knowledge are simply incomplete. If society through the law acts
incorrectly because of the inadequate knowledge, the consequences
on behavior may be devastating. If our society does not act,
similar consequences may occur. Lawyers, the managers of our
society, must study and understand physical as well as social
science research. They then must study the communications
problem and work out solutions to it. Without broad knowledge
76. The lack of adequate information about public issues causes severe problems
in the search for solutions. In the immigration field, for example, several attempts have
recently been made to introduce bills in Congress for new immigration controls based
on the view that our borders are being overrun by hordes of illegal aliens. Estimates
of the number of illegal aliens in the United States are, therefore, politically sensitive.
If the number could be shown conclusively to have increased substantially in recent
years, this could be used to support arguments for new immigration controls. On the
other hand, if the number of illegal aliens could be shown not to have increased
substantially in recent years, opponents of restrictive legislation could argue that the
problem had been exaggerated.
On June 26, 1985, a panel of the National Academy of Sciences estimated that there
are two to four million illegal aliens in the United States. This is a figure substantially
below the previous government estimate, which ran from four to six million in number.
The panel also noted, after an exhaustive study of immigration statistics, that the
number of illegal aliens has not increased sharply in recent years. Government officials
have argued vehemently that there has been such an increase. Further, the panel stated
that immigration statistics are totally inadequate for making decisions about immigration
policy, which has caused immigration policy to be made in a data vacuum. N.Y.
Times, June 26, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
False images of reality must not replace the facts. If they do, societal responses to
important social issues will greatly harm those affected by the solutions. Indeed, the
false image that aliens are increasingly entering the United States has been used by
the government since 1981 as an excuse to incarcerate approximately 2,000 Haitian
refugees for up to one year in "camps" and to segregate them by sex and age, thus
splitting up husbands, wives, and children, with cruel results. This incarceration and
the government's refusal to parole Haitians into the country pending a determination
of their asylum claims, while paroling other similarly situated refugees, led to a major
lawsuit challenging this discriminatory action. The Supreme Court, after more than
four years of litigation, finally barred INS from using national origin or race as a factor
in determining whether to parole each individual excludable refugee. Jean v. Nelson,
105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985). But the suffering these people endured can never be erased
from our memories.
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about the vast number of individual factors that exist in any
problem area, and about the way they interact, lawyers, law, and
our civilization are likely to act incorrectly.
All of what we have said also has enormous consequences for
legal education. It is clear that the most effective work of the
lawyer in practice depends on vision, depth, balance, range, and
humanity. These are, of course, the very things that a first rate
liberal arts education can and should induce in students. Thus,
the best "practical" education that law schools can offer to any
lawyer is the study of law as a liberal art. There are three
necessary ingredients to the study of law as a liberal art: technical
competency; intellectual integrity, or the making clear the meaning
of the art for the culture and all those involved in it; and the
spiritual aspect, or the quest of the art for service and beauty.
Technical proficiency, the mechanical underpinning of the art
of law, is indispensible to any lawyer. Any member of the
practicing bar must be able to do what is needed for any consumer
of the law's service, at any time, and with at least a certain level
of technical proficiency. It is sheer folly to require specialization
in law schools or at the bar. Technical proficiency cannot be
entrusted to a subordinate. Each lawyer must be minimally
competent in a variety of skills.
The intellectual ingredient of the art of law comes itself from
the achievement of technical proficiency. A lawyer cannot, for
example, learn the craft of legal writing, or learn how to read
legal and other materials with excruciating exactitude, without
some notion of the meaning of the institution of law and the roles
played by the various actors in the legal culture. What the law-
government institution does for and to the parties to a dispute,
the group or nation, and the entire civilization affected by it,
calls for explicit study on its own terms.
This is not all. Each major one of the individual crafts of the
law-government institution deserves its own study as a whole. For
example, there are varying theories of advocacy or rhetoric which
have been the basis for liberal arts since classical times. Moreover,
these theories, and ones that must be developed by the present
day scholars, are empty unless they build upon the ethical and
psychological nature of an issue and client, within the tribunal,
society, and law institution. There are also varying philosophies
of advocacy which are analogous to and at least as intriguing as
those in different branches of philosophy or political theory. There
are, further, varying theories of the aesthetics of advocacy.
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What we have said of advocacy, of course, can be said for
counseling, for the study of the craft of judging on both a trial
and appellate level, for legislation, and for all the various crafts
of law. Perhaps even more significantly, we have found in our
combined years of teaching law that the combination of the theory,
philosophy, and techniques of the crafts, stir otherwise uninterested
students to seek the beauty or service or both in the art of law.
This teaching style also has created the opportunities for intellec-
tual and moral growth among the same group. It has given them
the wherewithal to seek truth and knowledge throughout their
lifetime as lawyers and human beings. We must never underes-
timate human potential. The results of a true liberal arts education
in the law cannot be overestimated.
77
The law schools, therefore, must teach a broad range of the
crafts of law. If a law school is to give adequate training for the
bar, it has to teach the skills involved in at least the five major
crafts of law:78 (1) appellate argument; (2) trial advocacy; (3)
counseling; (4) negotiation; and (5) drafting. This is certainly not
a new proposal. Indeed, since the thirties, experimental work has
been going on in all these areas. Yet, legal education has progressed
very little from the days in which rules were said to determine
results and skills training was unknown. The hope that there
would be a rapid increase in the development of materials and
teaching techniques in the crafts of law in the post World War
II era never materialized. As late as 1979, the American Bar
Association talked about the importance of teaching skills for the
crafts of law.7"' We must reverse this trend. Academic lawyers
must do the research necessary to teach these skills. ""
77. Indeed, those results are clearly visible in the good lawyer. For example, it is
true that a first rate lawyer has skills superior to that of a lawyer trained in an inferior
manner. Day after day those differences appear in our legal culture. Anyone who
knows the difference between a good and poor lawyer can testify to this fact. For a
discussion of a liberal arts education in the law, see the articles cited in note 9, supra.
78. Additions to this list can easily be made. We limit ourselves to these five major.
crafts because in our definition of these crafts we mean to include the teaching of most
skills needed by lawyers.
One of the things that terrifies us as we look at the law school world and see that
skills are often taught without substance or that information is stressed to the exclusion
of an understanding of the process, is that those who are being trained in that limited
way are simply never going to know what they do not know. They will simply be
unable to judge adequately the necessary ingredients of a competent lawyer.
79. See Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Lawyer Competency: The Role of
the Law Schools, 1979 ABA SEc. LEG. ED. AND ADM. TO BAR.
80. Very little has been achieved in this area since Langdell's day. See supra note 5.
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More is needed, however. Law schools must give students the
wherewithal to pick up information. Scholars should devote time
and energy to create reading lists and syllabi in various areas.
Students must be encouraged to obtain a broad liberal arts
education and to pursue rigorously their interests with great vigor.
They should be encouraged to do more research and to write
essays on independent research topics.
Further, empirical and theoretical research must be combined
on substantive issues. Law students must have a working knowl-
edge of economics, social science methodologies, and social theory.
Joint projects by social scientists and lawyers must be encouraged. "
We need empirical knowledge about how various systems function,
how transactions occur,"2 and how better to communicate law to
those it affects. At the same time, we must continue the basic
training in the effective use of legal materials, case analysis,
doctrinal synthesis, and the acquisition of substantive knowledge.
This is certainly a large task for law schools to perform. It is
necessary for our legal culture and greater civilization, however,
that we do so. If disillusionment has set in amongst law school
professors and lawyers, if they do not believe law schools can
meet these goals,"' there is a simple answer for them: neither
81. The commercial arbitration studies undertaken under Soia Mentschikoff's
direction in the 1950's, are prime examples of the joining of lawyers and social scientists.
For publications from this effort, see, e.g., Haggard & Mentschikoff, supra note 2.
82. Broad knowledge about how transactions occur is vital to the commercial lawyer.
Soia used to tell a wonderful anecdote to illustrate the nature of a transaction:
One day, the residents of a small Spanish village discovered that the village donkey
was missing. The donkey provided the only means of transporting supplies to the
village, which was on a hill several miles from the nearest road. A scientific search
strategy was developed, and everyone but the village idiot put the plan into action by
fanning out in concentric circles designed to encompass every bit of land in the area.
A day-long search proved fruitless, and a more extensive search was planned for the
following day, when the villagers would fan out even further.
On the second day, the village idiot conducted his own search. At nightfall, the
villagers returned to their village discouraged because their search had failed once
again. To their surprise, they found the village idiot sitting in the middle of the square
with the donkey. When asked how he found the animal, the idiot answered, "I said
to myself, 'If I were a donkey, where would I go?' and I went, and there I was."
In law, also, scientific methodology and decision making based on what parties
themselves would do in a situation are no substitute for understanding the usual manner
in which things work.
83. It is customary for many faculties to argue that law schools are not equipped
to teach the legal crafts, that faculty members are not qualified to do so, and that the
teaching of the legal crafts should, therefore, be done by the practicing bar. We believe
that this is merely an attempt by law faculty to justify its own abdication of its
responsibility to prepare students for entry into the legal culture. The assumption
lurking beneath these arguments is that once a law student passes the bar, some magical
[Vol. 54
1986] THE LAST UNIVERSAL DISCIPLINE 745
rainbows nor the pot of gold can be obtained, nor would be worth
the having if it were. But the search is good.
transformation occurs which endows him with the capacity both to perform at a high
level of competence and to teach others how to do so. Such an assumption is, obviously,
nonsense, particularly when applied to all members of the practicing bar.
A second proposition often advanced to justify the failure by law faculty to teach
legal crafts and skills is that it would be too expensive because it would require a one-
on-one type of instruction. This is simply not correct. To adequately teach a craft skill,
a teacher must have the ability to deal both with the theoretical foundation and
understanding of the skill involved, and with the critical appraisal of the student's
attempted performance. Yet it is said that the technical skills involved in the use of
legal materials, case analysis, and problem issue spotting, is taught in every law school
in the country. Further, these law schools certainly do not teach these skills by one-on-
one type of instruction. Moreover, materials already exist, and others are in the process
of creation, to teach the skills and craft of law. See supra note 9; see, e.g., 1. STOTZKY &
S. MENTSCHIKOFF, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW-ELEMENTS (1981).
